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Redactioneel

Hier is dan het dubbeldikke zomernummer van het Bulletin. Voor het eerst overschrijden we wel heel ruim onze gewoonlijke omvang van een twintigtal pagina's.

Dit nummer is in hoofdzaak gewijd aan de achtergronden van de Existentiële Analyse en de Logotherapie.

Zo komen we in het eerste artikel van prof.dr. David Guttmann, Haifa - Israël, naast Viktor Frankl de naam en werk van Leopold Szondi tegen (1893-1986). De ooit gebruikte Szonditest is overigens al langere tijd buiten gebruik geraakt.

Een artikel van Frankl 'Time and Responsibility', dat *niet* hetzelfde is als het Duitse artikel 'Zeit und Verantwortung' uit 1947, opgenomen in 'Der Wille zum Sinn' (ISBN 3492212387). Nu in ieder geval in een Nederlandse werkvertaling.

dr.Willem Maas schrijft over de waardenanalyse als de uiteindelijke menselijke droom.

Ian Rory Owen, Wolverhampton, 'introduceert' een existentieel-fenomenologische benadering van de psychotherapie. Vanuit de moderne filosofie, waarin Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger voorlopers zijn om therapeutisch uit te komen bij Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Karl Jaspers en tenslotte verwijdt hij nog kort bij onder meer Frankl en Yalom.

In de Boekenhoek dit keer enkele Nederlandse titels. Waarbij de (goedkope) heruitgave van Freud's Droomduiding van Boom genoemd mag worden.

We sluiten het Bulletin af met de latijnse woorden boven een Amsterdamse kerk SPES ALTERA VITAE.

Het extra dikke zomernummer heeft veel in het Engels; toch is er voor de lezers die Nederlands verkiezen boven andere talen nog ongeveer evenveel als anders te lezen in onze eigen taal.

For our English readers there is a whole lot to be read. In this extra large summer-season family-pack Bulletin we do have for the major part articles in the English language. We hope you will enjoy it. Have a good summer holidays.

DRS.PIETER HOEKSTRA

LOGOTHERAPEUTIC AND 'DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY' APPROACHES TO MEANING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

David Guttman

Introduction

This article presents the 'picture of the human being' and the concept of meaning to two outstanding psychologists. Szondi and Frankl. They are among the many great personalities who have enriched our knowledge of the human psyche and made highly significant contributions to understanding the motivating forces behind human behaviour in the twentieth century. Szondi is known throughout the world as one of the major 'depth psychologists' and Frankl is the undisputed 'heigth psychologist'.

There are many commonalities and parallels in the personal and professional histories of these personalities. Both of them have written a tremendous number of books, articles, etc. Szondi has left behind him nine books and well over a hundred articles and monographs, while Frankl has written 31 books, hundreds of articles and chapters in books, and several of his books were translated into 26 languages. Both of them have developed their own version of psychotherapy, and based it on their philosophy about human life in general and on their theory of motivation in particular. Szondi has developed his anancology, or 'fate analysis', and Frankl is the 'father of logotherapy'. Both of them are products of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Szondi was born in Hungary and has lived and worked in Budapest and Switzerland since 1945 until his death. In the vicinity of Zürich he has established his own institute and it has become the centre for a world-wide training site in his philosophy and method of psychoanalysis/psychotherapy.

Frankl, on the other hand, has lived and worked in Vienna, Austria, and made significant contributions to the development of logotherapy in the world. Whilst Frankl didn't establish any institute of his own, his followers did develop logotherapy centres on all five continents.

Szondi's Scientific Work

The scientific work of Szondi encompassed two main periods: In the first one, lasting from 1936 to 1944 in Budapest, Hungary, Szondi concentrated his efforts on developing the theory and method of "fate analysis". In the second period, which started in 1945 and lasted until 1954, the question of whether or not it is possible to di-

rect fate was posed as the leading one. Szondi was interested to see how fate analysis could be used for therapeutic purposes. This second period in Szondi's scientific activities laid the basis for the new anancology, or the theory of fate analysis, which was further developed during Szondi's lifetime into a theory of psychotherapy (1963).

Prior to the first period, Szondi had undertaken his own fate analysis (between 1934 and 1936). This self-analysis and the dream in 1916 played central roles in the development of fate analysis. During that time he had originated the concept of the "family unconscious". The family unconscious in Szondi's theory is seen as consisting of the following:

In our unconscious, as important factors for our existence, there are models of ancestor figures that direct the fate of the offspring by force. Szondi called this factor "forced fate". It comprises the "family unconscious" of the offspring many generations later. The "family unconscious" contains the aspirations of the ancestors. The opponent of the ancestors is the ego of the offspring, which can take a stand. The ego is capable of choice, despite the interest of the ancestors. This choice forms the basis for the concepts of "free, egotropic choice" and the "freely chosen fate". Szondi called this ability of the human being to choose his fate "directed fatalism". He also made this ability the cornerstone in his "fate-analysis therapy" (1963).

In the ancient Greek language fate is *ananke*. There are two meanings to this concept: The first is a limit on freedom due to some outside force. In this sense, fate means suffering or worry. The second meaning of *ananke* is "blood relations" such as the family. Thus fate includes both force and family. Until the end of World War II, fate as a subject of scientific investigation has seen two periods:

1. As an ancient concept, meaning that fate is a compelling force inside our psyche which expresses itself in the choices we make in life. Szondi in *Fate Analysis* (1944) reported on a case, the third one, which led to the establishment of fate analysis. This case involved a man, whose mother had fears about poisoning others, who selected for his wife a woman who a few years later in the marriage developed similar fears to those of her husband's mother. Szondi asked himself the most crucial question in fate analysis: "Why did that man fall in love with that particular woman, and not with somebody else? Szondi was not content to accept the common sense answer of "coincidence". This question was the basis for his major work *Analysis of Marriages* (1937). Additional choice related questions were derived later when fate

analysis was reinforced by the thousands upon thousands of cases in which evidence was found for his approach.

2. In the "family unconscious" Szondi investigated the opposing interests of the ancestors and found that choice is of utmost importance for the offspring, for the family unconscious speaks in the language of choice. Szondi has maintained that despite the genetic inheritance we all carry, men can freely choose part of their fates. And the greater that part, the easier it is to carry one's own fate. Those who succumb to their genetic inheritance (their forced fate) are totally dependent on their family unconscious. Szondi has found that there are three tools for discovering the hidden intentions contained in the "family unconscious" of the patient:

- * The experiencing of the pathological intentions during fate analysis.

- * Confrontation of the patient with those intentions on the basis of the patient's "genetic inheritance", and

- * Confrontation with the latent family instincts via experiential fate diagnosis.

The procedure used by Szondi for the above was similar to traditional psychoanalysis. The patient would lie on a couch, and his dreams would be analysed with the technique of free associations. The diversion from the basically passive Freudian psychoanalysis was based on the observation in patient behaviour during analysis. Szondi has found that the chain of associations was interrupted by something deeper than the regular opposition, and this opposition was usually expressed by sudden, traumatic behaviours and attacks. These required an active response from the therapist, and his help to let the patient express all those fears and anxieties that are connected to his "family unconscious" and to take a stand against them. (Szondi, 1996, p.73)

Components of the Concept of Fate

Szondi maintained that fate analysis requires a solid understanding of all the factors that shape fate, both causative and formative ones. In his use of the term, fate has seven main meanings: Forced, selected, character, mental, social, instinctual and spiritual fate. Each of these seven factors are components of the concept of fate. And each factor, or component, contains pairs of opposing traits. For example, in the "selected fate" we must take into account that there are many things contained in that

concept, such as masculinity -femininity, spirit - nature, conscious - unconscious, objective - subjective, etc. Fate, in Szondi's analysis, is always the result of the behaviour exhibited by the subject in relation to the opposing forces. And the human quest is always to attain wholeness. In Szondi's work, the ego, like in the theory of Freud, is the mediator between opposing forces, but, unlike in Freud's theory, this mediation gives birth to the individual's fate.

Of the seven factors, spiritual fate is the closest to Frankl's concept of the spiritual dimension which occupies a central position in human life. According to fate analysis, the ego and spiritual fate together form a hand which directs to a large degree the activities of the instinctual forces of man. These two factors in combination are capable of turning the instinctual forces against their original goals. This turning of the destructive forces in men (what Szondi calls "the nature of Cain") by virtue of the spiritual fate and the ego corresponds to a degree with Frankl's concept of the human being as capable of "selftranscendence", of which more will be said later. For "spiritual fate" is seen by Szondi as the highest instance among the seven components of fate (Szondi, 1987).

The importance of the "spiritual fate" becomes evident in the theory of Szondi when he speaks about those who succumb to their fate, those who suffer from fate that is forced on them. These are the people who are incapable of solving the opposing forces in their instinctual fate and the environmental influences acting on them. There are many people who suffer throughout all their lives from the fate they have inherited from their ancestors. They lack ego and spiritual strengths to overcome with their help the compelling forces in their inheritance. And they are incapable to choose from the many possibilities open before them a "piece" of individual and private life. They are sick because the functions of their faith are paralyzed.

As Frankl has shown (1962), faith is directed toward the future. Szondi concurs with that direction. The relationship of the ego to the future, in Szondi's terms, is of the utmost importance from the standpoint of the individual's fate. The function of the ego is to serve as a bridge between the spirit and the inherited instinctual forces. And the spiritual fate of the human being is capable of turning a person into a real human being. The strength of functional faith and its quality are dependent on the strength of the ego in terms of its libido, mental energy,

interests and the social environment. If the ego disperses its energy to satisfy the instincts, its chances to get sick are great. And in order to prevent mental illness, the ego needs to give control to the spirit, rather than to *materia*, and only faith can help the ego to attain that function.

Szondi's Mental Picture of the Human Being

The question: *How does an individuum become a human being?* or the process by which man attains the designation of a "human being" (in the spiritual sense of the word) has been raised over and over by the leading "depth psychologists". Freud's discovery of the unconscious and its many manifestations and expressions via dreams symptoms, and the "psychopathology of everyday life" (Freud, 1991) has opened new perspectives for psychology. Psychoanalysis, in Szondi's approach, affected the mental picture of the human being in two ways: One, by discovering the irrational forces in the unconscious, which, if unchecked by the ego, may cause serious harm to both the individual and the collective, and two, by the "reality principle" (of Freud) by which the founder of psychoanalysis tried in vain to educate mankind to adapt to the reality in order to escape the dangers inherent in the irrational forces.

Szondi saw in fate the sum total of existential possibilities given to human beings by way of his genetic and social inheritance. Between those possible ways of existence both in a positive and in a negative sense, that people bring with them from birth in a healthy condition, man can freely choose his fate and his existence. This freedom is expressed in man's ability to overcome the forced nature of his fate with the help of his spirit and the strength of his ego. Those people who are incapable to do so, will fall victim to their "forced fates and become neurotic or even psychotic (Szondi, 1996, p.6).

When a human being is born, he brings with him the forced fate of his ancestors. Later, with his development, as he passes through the first four phases of life, he may become a *homo elector* that is, a person who chooses, or elects, his own fate. This election is possible only when the individual is able to use his Pontifex ego. In Szondi's theory (1996) the Pontifex ego is analogous to Freud's super-ego, as well as to Adler's "compensations", and to Jung's "myself". Each of these "higher egos" relate to the highest aspect in the structure of the human - psyche (Szondi, p.56). The structure of both forced and elected fate decides one's fate. Szondi emphasized that man has not only one

fate, as the old anancology has taught, but more than one "fate possibilities", which are sometimes of opposing directions (Szondi, p.57). The highest form of being, Szondi claims, is, once man was capable of being himself to return to the collective, the love of mankind. This is the main task of the *homo elector*. This is the difference between *homo individuator* (of Jung) and "*homo elector* (of Szondi). The former refers to those who are basically narcissistic, who love themselves, whereas the latter expand their love to others, like in Frankl's concept of *self-transcendence*. But attainment of the *homo elector* is not yet the highest achievement in the way to become a human being, says Szondi. *Homo liberator* and *homo humanisator* are two concepts which, more than anything else, express Szondi's faith in mankind. Both stations can be achieved by human beings whose faith, in the spiritual sense, in a loving human collective means liberation from the confines of their instinctual nature and from the loneliness of selflove (Szondi, 1996, p.60).

Viktor Emil Frankl's Logotherapy

Introduction: Logotherapy's Philosophical and Guiding Principles

Logotherapy is build on 'three pillars': On the freedom of the will, on the will to meaning, and on the meaning of suffering. In developing logotherapy, Frankl intended to complement Freud's 'depth psychology' with 'height psychology', a psychology which, in Frankl's words, 'would do justice to man's higher aspects and aspirations'. Frankl (1967) cites the astronaut John H. Glenn, jr., who said that: 'What is needed is a basis of convictions and beliefs so strong that they lifted individuals clear out of themselves and caused them to live, and die, for some aim nobler and better than themselves'. (Frankl, p.18).

Frankl saw the issue of responsibility as one of the central tenets in psychotherapy. In his view, it is the patient/client who has to decide what he is responsible for, and how he perceives life's demands from him at a given moment. Frankl also discussed the methodology by which the patient's sense of responsibility could be heightened and coined the concept of logotherapy to emphasise a meaning-centred approach to psychotherapy. Frankl had been aware of the separation between human dignity and psychotherapy, and used the concept of responsibility to reconnect these two elements. Frankl said:

"Conventional psychotherapy is content with making people 'free from' psychological and physical

inhibitions or difficulties and with extending the sphere of the ego as against that of the id. Both logotherapy and existential analysis seek to make people in another and more basic sense: 'free to taker their responsibility upon themselves.' (Frankl, 1986, p.273)

Logotherapy is neither a philosophy by itself nor a psychotherapy that stands apart from other established schools (Kovacs, 1985). Rather, it is a way of thinking and a methodology combined together in a process aimed at enabling clients to discover meaning in their lives. Logotherapy's clientele constitute a rather large group of people: In addition to those suffering from various forms of noögenic neuroses, that is, from neuroses that originate in the noetic or spiritual dimension, logotherapy has developed methods for dealing with clients who suffer from phobias in their sexual behaviour, for those with incurable diseases, and for those who lead empty and meaningless lives. Logotherapy can also serve as a complement, and/or supplement, to conventional methods of psychotherapy in cases of addictions, victims of accidents, the physically disabled who have lost limbs, and others, especially in cases in which the losses are accompanied with a lack of meaning in life.

Meaning, Frankl states, exists under all circumstances. *"That meaning must be specific and personal, a meaning which can be realized by this one person."* (Frankl, 1986, p.xvi) Meaning can be achieved by realizing creative, experiential and attitudinal values. Frankl claims that *"even a man who finds himself in the greatest distress, in which neither activity nor creativity can bring values to life, nor experience give meaning to it - even such a man still gives his life a meaning by the way he faces his fate, his distress. By taking his unavoidable suffering upon himself, he may yet realize values."* (Frankl, p.xix)

When a person is unable to discover, recognize and accept meaning, he finds himself in an 'existential vacuum'. This vacuum cries out for fulfillment. Those who are unable to fill their lives by finding meaning, are apt to pay a price in the form of psychiatric symptoms, such as anomie, addiction and aggression, which in their severest forms lead to what Frankl has termed as 'existential neurosis'. These persons suffer from anxiety and depression.

The meaning of the moment

Problems in living are part and parcel of everyday life. At every moment we may be called upon to make decisions in many areas. Some of these may be very simple, while others can be complex with far reaching consequences for

the individual, the family, and even society. Thus life may be perceived as a never-ending chain of decisions to assure our survival and to give content to our days upon this earth. Each situation in life is unique. It cannot be substituted for by someone else's. Nor can someone else take on our lives, or problems.

The meaning of the moment stands between past accomplishments that are safely stored away in our memory bank, and between future possibilities, that are waiting to be grasped. It is transitory, cannot be repeated, cannot be postponed, not delayed. Life forces it upon us whether we like it or not. The meaning potential is always present in a given situation. We are required to discover it - and to act for its realization. (Guttman, 1996).

The Supra or Ultimate Meaning

As an abstract concept, the term 'ultimate meaning' is hard to grasp, yet its existence is evident. We just have to look around in nature to see that there is some Order in the world - both on our own planet and beyond. How did this Order come about? How does it work? How does it affect the lives of the people on Earth? These are some of the questions that the greatest philosophers, humanists, and psychologists have asked, and continue to ask from one generation to the next. (Einstein, 1934). No one has real answers, and yet, there are opportunities when one can experience something extraordinary which reaffirms the existence of that special dimension.

Whether or not one believes in God is a personal matter and a private value. However, for a professional there is a need to formulate a world view, a basic perception of this world, which provides him or her with a sense of security. Moreover, he/she has to internalise values that are an integral part of his/her respective professions. At times these values may be similar, even identical to the personal values, but it is possible that the personal and professional values do not correspond. In such cases the professional can find himself/herself in a value conflict. Frankl's 'mental picture of the human being' can help those professionals and laymen alike who are in doubt.

Frankl's 'View of the Human Being - Homo Patiens'

Pain and Suffering

Frankl is the originator of the concept of the *tragic triad*, which consists of pain and suffering, guilt and death. These are experiences that some time in life we all have to encounter. But

the way we encounter these trying events depends upon the attitude we take toward them. For in all of them there are opportunities for finding meaning in life. Frankl (1962) claims that we have the ability to turn tragedies to human achievements by virtue of finding a meaning to our suffering. We can turn guilt to a level of true repentance and service to others, and we can accept death as inevitable, as our fate, and as a motivating factor to make our life meaningful. There is value in *homo patiens*, the suffering man, so long as it changes us to better human beings. Understanding the concept of the *tragic triad* is important for the terminally ill and their therapists, while for the families of the sick it is absolutely necessary. Therefore, no psychotherapist can disregard the logotherapeutic approach to that concept.

Frankl (1963) stated: 'Suffering is an ineradicable part of life, as is fate and death. Without suffering and death human life cannot be complete.' (p.154).

Frankl (1967) emphasizes that man is ready and willing to shoulder any suffering as soon and as long as he can see a meaning in it. For without this discovery suffering can turn into despair and self-destruction. In his writings he also speaks of three types of suffering. That which is associated with an unchangeable fate, that which comes as a result of an emotionally painful experience, and that which arises out of the meaninglessness of one's life.

The avoidance of misery and human unhappiness is a shared goal by all the helping professions. Various schools of psychotherapy aim at reducing the causes and treat the symptoms of suffering and pain. They tend to see in psychic misery only the negative aspects, those that can be eradicated by science, while the creative powers inherent in human suffering, and the bravery required to confront it, are largely ignored. Logotherapy, on the other hand, perceives unavoidable suffering as an opportunity to demonstrate man's capacity to rise above pain, above suffering, by making use of his 'defiant power of the human spirit', a concept coined by Frankl to demonstrate human achievement. For Frankl 'the right kind of human suffering is facing your fate without flinching. This is the highest achievement that has been granted to man.' (Frankl, 1986, p.XIX).

Logotherapy's insistence on the unconditional meaningfulness of life - even against the reality of death - is based on Frankl's analysis of the meaning of death for all human beings. Frankl claims that we are the only creatures upon this

earth who are aware of their own death. And this discovery should lead us toward the reawakening of the responsibility toward life, instead of denial of death's existence.

Frankl's attitudinal values toward life and toward death are always aimed at others, rather than to one's self. It is the caring for others, for their welfare, for their peace of mind, for their comfort, and for their consolation which raises attitudinal values high above all others. And to make this caring meaningful is the aim of the logotherapist.

Summary

The 'picture of the human being' of two major psychologists are compared and contrasted with respect to their approaches to psychotherapy. Szondi's 'homo elector' is based on his 'family unconscious' and genetic inheritance. These include both positive and negative traits that man brings with him to the world from the ancestors, as well as all the possibilities for choice. According to Szondi, the fate of man in five major areas of life, namely in love, friendship, occupation, sickness and death are not predestined. Man is able to choose his fate despite the oppressing forces of his inheritance.

In summing up Szondi's work, one is struck by the duality of man's nature: His 'forced fate' versus 'selected fate'. Szondi claims that man can continue to adhere to his murderous inclinations, as contained in his 'Cain's fate' (Szondi, 1987), or can use his conscience to recognize this tendency to sin and contradict it, his 'transformation to Moses'. The tendency to kill is as old as human history, says Szondi, and therefore it is ever present. But the recognition of sin is also present from ancient times in the human soul. And man can lead a life in which he aims to become like Moses who struggled with his Cain's spirit and sin, and came out glorious, meaning that he turned his murderous past into the highest achievement that a human being can attain: to become the founder of law and morals.

Frankl's 'homo patiens' is one who has to confront his suffering which cannot be changed or cured by way of conventional medicine. In his logotherapy, the meaning-centered psychotherapy, man can use his unique capacities of 'self-transcendence' and 'self-detachment' and elevate himself to a spiritual height in the struggle with the forces and the vicissitudes of life. Man has the freedom to decide which stance he wishes to take: To succumb to his fate, or to use his freedom of choice. The meaning assign-

ned by man to what happens to him and his search for a meaningful life are central concepts in Frankl's approach to psychotherapy.

In summing up Frankl's work in relation to meaning and to the picture of the human being, one can say without hesitation that Frankl has basically continued to elevate man to a higher plateau than the one contained in 'fate analyses'. While both Szondi and Frankl agree that man has both potentialities within himself (to be a saint or a swine), Frankl's approach to human destiny is much more positive than Szondi's. Frankl has shown that man always has the freedom to choose a meaningful life, even under the most trying circumstances. His unconditional faith in human freedom, in human choice, in self-transcendence, and in the defiant power of the human spirit, make logotherapy into such a valuable tool for psychotherapy and a philosophy for survival in an increasingly important, cruel and cold world.

Both Frankl and Szondi have enriched our knowledge of the human being, each in his own unique approach. Yet, common to both of them is a deep concern for the fate of mankind. These outstanding human beings represent two important avenues to psychotherapy and they left behind them theories that light our ways in the present and give hope for the future.

DAVID GUTTMANN, DSW, is Professor in the Faculty of Social Welfare and Health Studies, School of Social Work, University of Haifa, and is a former Dean of the School of Social Work, University of Haifa, Israel.

(Editor's note)

Prof.dr.David Guttmann is the author of several books on Social Work. The latest one, *LOGOTHERAPY FOR THE HELPING PROFESSIONAL - MEANINGFUL SOCIAL WORK*, published by the Springer Publishing Company of New York in 1996, provides a thorough introduction to the concepts and application of logotherapy in the field of Social Work and is highly recommended. An autobiographical book, *HOME COMING*, has just been published and describes his youth in Hungary and the long way to Israel.

The above article is an abbreviation of a chapter written by David Guttmann for a new book, and was made available to us by the author with the permission of the editors. It has been published in the 'Viktor Frankl Joernaal', vol. 4, nr.1 april 1999 of the 'Stigting van Suid-Afrika. Editor: dr.Patti Ha-

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TIJD EN VERANTWOORDELIJKHEID Viktor E. Frankl

(Dit artikel is de werkvertaling van 'Time and Responsibility'. Het Duitse origineel heb ik nog niet achterhaald. Het ligt in de bedoeling dat dit artikel opgenomen wordt in de geplande (her)uitgave van de werken van Viktor E. Frankl in het Nederlands. Aan de vertalingen worden noten toegevoegd. Reacties en aanvullingen op deze werkvertaling kunt u aan mij doen toekomen per E-mail of post. PIETER HOEKSTRA)

Logotherapie veronderstelt dat de geest van de mens vrij is om keuzes te maken. Het plaatst verantwoordelijkheid in het centrum van de menselijke existentie. De vraag wordt vaak gesteld: Hoe kan verantwoordelijkheid een basaal onderdeel zijn van ons bestaan, uitgaande van de voorbijgaande aard van onze levens? Want wanneer wij het idee aanvaarden dat alles voorbijgaat, komen we uiteindelijk tot het punt waar we alleen zien dat de toekomst (nog) niet bestaat en het verleden niet (meer) bestaat; daarom is alleen het heden hetgeen dat echt bestaat. Vanuit dit beeld is de mens een wezen dat nergens vandaan komt en nergens naar toe gaat; uit niets geboren en door niets bedreigd. Hoe, met dit beeld voor ogen, kan hij betekenis vinden in zijn bestaan en de kracht om verantwoordelijke keuzes maken?

Deze nadruk op de unieke betekenis van het heden is het beginpunt van de existentiële filosofie. De tegenovergestelde visie wordt aangehangen door het quietisme (zoals het ontwikkeld is van Plato tot Augustinus), dat niet het heden op het oog heeft, maar de eeuwigheid als de ware realiteit. Quietisme ziet eeuwigheid als een gelijktijdige, vier-dimensionale werkelijkheid: permanent, onbuigzaam en voorbeschikt. Het ontkent niet alleen de realiteit van toekomst en verleden maar ook de realiteit van tijd zelf. Volgens de quietistische visie is tijd iets imaginairs: verleden, heden en toekomst zijn slechts illusies van ons bewustzijn en verschijnen alleen om elkaar op te volgen, terwijl ze feitelijk naast elkaar bestaan.

De quietistische visie leidt noodzakelijk tot fatalisme: de mens blijft passief omdat alles 'is' en niet veranderd kan worden. Dit fatalisme, voortgekomen uit een geloof in een eeuwige staat van zijn heeft zijn tegenhanger in het pessimisme van de existentiële filosofie, de onontkoombare consequentie van de overtuiging dat alles altijd in beweging en veranderlijk is.

Logotherapie neemt een middenpositie in tussen deze twee visies van existentiële filosofie en quietisme, welke het best kan worden vergeleken met een zandloper - het oude symbool van de tijd. Beschouw het bovenste deel van

de zandloper als verwijzend naar de toekomst - dat wat nog altijd moet komen zou dan het zand in het bovenste deel zijn. Het zand loopt door de nauwe doorgang - het heden - in het onderste deel van de zandloper, wat staat voor het verleden. Existentiële filosofie ziet alleen de nauwe doorgang van het heden terwijl het geen oog heeft voor het bovenste en onderste deel, de toekomst en het verleden. Het Quietisme aan de andere kant ziet de zandloper in z'n geheel maar beschouwd het zand als een onveranderlijke massa, die niet 'loopt' - het 'is' slechts. Logotherapie zou willen stellen dat, terwijl het waar is dat de toekomst echt 'niet is' het verleden de werkelijke realiteit is.

In het verleden is alles voor eeuwig bewaard!

Terwijl deze positie nog steeds uitgelegd kan worden met de vergelijking van de zandloper, loopt de vergelijking, zoals iedere gelijkenis, mank. Maar het is juist door deze fouten dat de ware betekenis van tijd aangetoond kan worden. Een zandloper kan worden omgedraaid als het bovenste gedeelte leeg geraakt is. Dit kan niet met tijd worden gedaan - tijd is onomkeerbaar. Een ander verschil: door de zandloper te schudden kunnen we de zandkorrels dooreen schudden, waardoor hun positie ten opzichte van elkaar wordt veranderd. Met tijd kunnen we dit maar deels doen: we kunnen 'op-schrikken' en de toekomst veranderen, en daarmee onszelf veranderen. Maar het verleden ligt vast. Terugkerend naar de vergelijking van de zandloper: wanneer het zand door de nauwe opening van het heden is gelopen, wordt het onbeweeglijk, alsof het behandeld is met een hardend materiaal, of liever een conserverende stof. In het verleden is alles voor eeuwig vastgelegd.

*Mogelijkheden, eens gerealiseerd,
blijven voor eeuwig!*

Logotherapie stelt dat wat vergankelijk en van voorbijgaande aard is tevens de mogelijkheden zijn, de kansen om waarden te realiseren, de mogelijkheden om te scheppen, te ervaren, en betekenisvol te lijden. Wanneer de mogelijkheden zijn gerealiseerd gaan deze niet meer voorbij, ze zijn gebeurd en zijn deel van het verleden - wat betekent dat ze bewaard blijven; niets kan ze veranderen, niets kan ze ongedaan maken. Zij blijven voor eeuwig.

Daarom benadrukt logotherapie het optimisme van het verleden, terwijl existentiële filosofie het pessimisme van het heden beklemtoont. Laten we overwegen welke praktische betekenis een dergelijke visie, dat betekent, van gebeurtenissen die deel zijn van het verleden - met de nadruk op 'zijn'; meer dan op 'verleden' - in het leven van een individu heeft. Veronder-

stel: een vrouw die haar echtgenoot verloren heeft na slechts één jaar huwelijk; ze is wanhopig en ziet geen zin meer in haar toekomstig leven. Het betekent veel voor zo'n mens als zij zich bewust kan worden dat zij dit ene jaar van puur geluk bewaard heeft, dat zij het gered heeft voor haar verleden waar het veilig opgeborgen blijft voor altijd, en dat niets en niemand deze ervaring van haar weg kan nemen.

*Zelfs wat de mens vergeten is,
blijft bewaard in het verleden!*

Maar, kan men vragen, is deze herinnering ook niet vergankelijk? Wie, bijvoorbeeld, houdt de herinnering 'levend' nadat de weduwe gestorven is? Hierop kunnen we antwoorden, dat het onbelangrijk is of iemand het herinnert of niet; net zoals het irrelevant is of we ergens naar kijken, of ergens aan denken, het bestaat nog altijd en is bij ons. Want het bestaat los van het feit wij er naar kijken of er aan denken. Hoewel het waar is dat we niets met ons mee kunnen nemen als we sterven, de totaliteit van ons leven, dat we hebben geleefd in z'n volheid en de dood, blijft buiten het graf, en buiten het graf blijft het. En het blijft niet ondanks, maar omdat, het is in het verleden gegleden en is daar bewaard. Zelfs wat wij vergeten hebben, wat ontsnapt is aan ons bewustzijn, blijft bewaard in het verleden; het kan niet vernietigd worden, het 'is' en blijft deel van de wereld.

En zelfs als het nooit ons bewustzijn heeft bereikt, bestaat het toch, het is de wereld binnengekomen en is werkelijkheid geworden. Om te identificeren wat deel is van het verleden met wat wordt herinnerd zou een subjectivistische en psychologische her-interpretatie zijn van ons begrip van het existentiële karakter van het verleden.

Alles is vergankelijk

Het is waar, aan de ene kant is alles vergankelijk - een mens, een kind dat we voortbrengen, een geweldige gedachte, een grote liefde waaruit het kind is ontsproten. De dagen onzer jaren, daarin zijn zeventig jaren, en, indien wij sterk zijn, tachtig jaren¹ en als het een goed leven is geweest, was het de moeite waard. Wel, een geweldige gedachte duurt dan misschien maar zeven seconden, maar het was een goede gedachte en bevatte waarheid. Maar de geweldige gedachte is net zo vergankelijk als het kind of de grote liefde. Alles is vergankelijk.²

Maar aan de andere kant is alles eeuwig. Niet alleen dat: het wordt eeuwig in zichzelf. We hoeven er niets aan te doen. Maar we hebben

een verantwoordelijkheid - de verantwoordelijkheid te kiezen wat deel wordt van de eeuwigheid als gevolg van onze keuzes.

De wereld is een manuscript waarbij ons gevraagd wordt - wat we niet kunnen - het te ontcijferen

Alles wordt opgeschreven in een eeuwig verslag - ons hele leven, al onze daden, onze ervaringen en ons lijden. Dit alles wordt bewaard in het verslag en blijft daar. De wereld is niet, zoals ene groot filosoof het zag, een manuscript geschreven in een code die wij moeten ontcijferen. Nee, de wereld is geen manuscript, waartoe wij gevraagd worden het te ontcijferen, maar dit niet kunnen; het is eerder een verslag, dat we onszelf hebben te dicteren.

Het leven is een Vraag en Antwoord test

Het verslag wordt neergeschreven in een dramatische vorm. Zoals Martin Buber zei, de geest functioneert niet in monologen, maar in dialogen. Het verslag van de wereld is in een dramatische vorm omdat het de verslagen van onze levens bevat, en het leven stelt ons voortdurend voor vragen, het bevraagt ons, en wij moeten antwoorden en verantwoordelijk zijn. Werkelijk, het leven is een vraag-en-antwoord test.

Het eeuwige verslag kan niet verloren gaan - dat is een geruststelling en een hoop. Maar het kan ook niet verbeterd worden - en dat is een waarschuwing en vermaning. Het herinnert ons er aan dat, niets bestaands in de realiteit van het verleden kan worden weggenomen, het is aan ons het daar te stellen en dat voort te zetten. Op die wijze, zet de logotherapie niet alleen een optimisme van het verleden neer (in tegenstelling tot het pessimisme van het heden van de existentiële filosofie) maar ook een activisme van de toekomst (in tegenstelling tot het fatalisme van de eeuwigheid van het quietisme). Want, als alles in het verleden voor eeuwig bewaard is, hangt alles af van wat wij, in het heden, op elk moment van ons leven, kiezen te 'scheppen' door het deel van het verleden te maken. Deze 'schepping in de existentie', in het verleden, is in de laatste analyse, een schepping uit het niets³ - uit het vacuüm van de toekomst.

Dit daarom, is waarom alles is zo vergankelijk: alles vloeit omdat alles voortvloeit uit het niets van de toekomst en binnen vloeit in de realiteit van het verleden. Het is alsof alles wordt verschrikt door de angst voor het niets en zich haast van de toekomst naar het verleden en in de existentie, een verstopping veroorzakend bij de nauwe doorgang van het heden. Daar hoopt alles zich op en drukt en wacht op bezorging - óf als een gebeuren voorbijgaand in het

¹Psalm 90:10 mylht

²Prediker 3 tlhq

³Creatio ex nihilo

verleden, óf als onze ervaring of onze beslissing door ons toegelaten in de eeuwigheid.

De nauwe doorgang van het heden die leidt van het niets in de toekomst naar het eeuwig bestaan van het verleden is, daarom, de grens tussen niets en existentie; het is de grens van de eeuwigheid. Hieruit volgt dat eeuwigheid eindig is - het strekt zich altijd uit tot het moment van het heden, tot het moment wanneer wij *beslissen* wat wij willen toelaten in de eeuwigheid. De grens van de eeuwigheid is de plaats waar, op ieder moment van ons leven, onze beslissing valt welke keuzes wij toelaten in het verleden zodat ze eeuwig worden.

Als wij op deze wijze naar de tijd kijken, zien we ook dat 'tijd winnen' niet betekent iets uitstellen naar de toekomst, we stellen het veilig voor het verleden.

Wat uiteindelijk gebeurt, als alle zand door de zandloper is gelopen en het bovenste deel leeggeraakt is? Als de tijd voor ons verlopen is en onze eigen existentie naar zijn eindpunt is gelopen - de dood?

In de dood wordt alles onbeweeglijk, niets kan meer veranderd worden. De persoon is niets overgebleven, heeft geen invloed meer op zijn lichaam en zijn psyche. Hij heeft zijn psychofysische ego volkomen verloren. Wat overblijft is het zelf, de spirituele 'zelf' (geestelijke persoon, РН). De mens heeft niet langer een ego, hij 'heeft' niets over, hij 'is' slechts - zijn 'zelf'.

Sommige mensen zeggen, dat een mens, die sterft tijdens een plotseling ongeluk, zijn hele leven voorbij ziet flitsen, als een ongelooflijk snelle film. Om bij dit beeld te blijven, kan men zeggen dat de dode man zelf tot de film is geworden. Hij 'is' nu zijn leven, zoals hij het geleefd heeft, hij is zijn eigen levensgeschiedenis zoals het aan hem gebeurd is, zo goed als hij het geschapen heeft. Dus, hij is zijn eigen hemel en zijn eigen hel.

Dit leidt tot de paradox dat het eigen verleden van de mens zijn ware toekomst is. De stervende man heeft geen toekomst, alleen een verleden. Maar de dood 'is' zijn verleden. Hij heeft geen leven, hij is zijn leven. Dat het zijn voorbije leven is doet er niet toe; wij weten dat het verleden de veiligste vorm van existentie is - het kan niet worden weggenomen.

Het verleden van de mens is voltooid verleden tijd in de letterlijke zin van het woord, niet onvoltooid verleden tijd. Zijn leven is voltooid, compleet - het bestaat alleen als een afgerond leven. Terwijl tijdens het leven alleen enkele *faits accomplis* door de nauwe doorgang van de zandloper komen, nu, na de dood, het leven in z'n totaliteit is er doorheen gegaan - *als par-fait accompli!*

Dit leidt tot een tweede paradox - een dubbele: We zeiden eerder dat we iets tot een werkelijk-

heid maken door het door te geven, in de existentie van het verleden. Als dat zo is, dan is het de mens zelf die zichzelf een realiteit maakt, want het is zijn eigen 'zelf' die hij tot realiteit maakt bij het afronden van zijn leven. En ten tweede, de mens wordt niet tot realiteit bij zijn geboorte, maar bij zijn dood, want zijn 'zelf' is niet iets dat 'is', maar iets dat wordt - en pas afgerond is op het moment van zijn dood.

Mensen verstaan de betekenis van de dood over het algemeen verkeerd. Wanneer de wekker 's morgens afgaat en ons opschrikt uit onze dromen, beschouwen we dit wakker worden als een wrede inbreuk in onze droomwereld en beseffen niet dat de wekker ons opwekt voor onze werkelijke existentie, onze dag-wereld. Doen wij stervelingen niet hetzelfde als we schrikken als de dood komt? Verstaan ook wij het niet verkeerd als de dood ons wekt tot de ware realiteit van ons zelf?

En zelfs als een liefhebbende hand ons opwekt uit de slaap - de beweging mag dan zo teder zijn, maar we beseffen de tederheid niet - we voelen alleen de schrikwekkende inbreuk op onze droomwereld. Op dezelfde wijze beschouwen wij de dood als iets schrikwekkends dat ons overkomt en we vermoeden nauwelijks hoe goed het is bedoeld!

De zin van het leven wordt niet vernietigd door de dood

Logotherapie beschouwt de verhouding tussen tijd en verantwoordelijkheid in positieve termen. Onze verantwoordelijkheid is inderdaad een basis-gegeven van ons leven, en zijn betekenis is zeker niet vernietigd bij de vergankelijke natuur van onze existentie. Integendeel: de menselijke verantwoordelijkheid, het fundament van een zinvol leven, rust op de stroom van de tijd vanuit een toekomst die louter uit mogelijkheden bestaat naar een verleden, dat de werkelijkheid bevat. Menselijke verantwoordelijkheid rust op de 'activiteit van de toekomst', het kiezen van mogelijkheden vanuit de toekomst en het 'optimisme van het verleden', het maken van de mogelijkheden tot werkelijkheid en deze daarmee redden in de veilige haven van het verleden.

VALUE ANALYSIS, GATEWAY TO THE ULTIMATE HUMAN DREAM

© W.J. Maas Ph.D.

*'Der Mensch ist letztlich ein um den
konkreten Sinn seines persönlichen Dasein geistig
ringendes Wesen'*

(V. E. Frankl)

Psychotherapy as I understand it is the professional help relationship, which is the human, conscient psycho-agogic activity coming from the unconditional respect for the life of the other, who - out of free will - appears to be the one who wants help in restoring trust in the unconditional meaning of life, in freedom for change and in responsibility in actu (c.f. Frankl, *die Sinnfrage in der Psychotherapie*, München 1981, p. 77 ff, 172).

Frankl's contribution to psychotherapy is called Logotherapy (1925) and his scientific approach to psychotherapy is called Existential Analysis (1938).

Existential Analysis is the English for *Existenzanalyse*, differing from *Daseinsanalyse* (Binswanger, Heidegger, Szondi), basically in the underlying anthropology (Frankl, 1946).

Frankl did not develop Logotherapy and Existential Analysis just out of frustration with the theories of Freud and Adler, nor did he just solve his own neurotic problem. However there are close relations with Freud and Adler, since man of Frankl's central items like meaning, freedom, responsibility, human dignity and humanity, situation and condition indeed comment on lacunas with the masters of the field.

There is also a striking coincidence between Frankl's work and his life during the years of imprisonment in the Nazi-concentration camps, although one cannot limit the meaning, bearing and contribution of Frankl's work to psychotherapy to 'just another theory about coping with trauma'.

In terms of developing psychotherapy, I also mention the vast difference between the unconscious and existential with Frankl and Jung. Frankl offers not just a different approach, but basically a 'critic of psychotherapy' (e.g. *Der unbedingte Mensch - Metaklinische Vorlesungen*, 1946) which enables and allows the integrative work modern psychotherapy is largely developing into. Apart from this, Frankl is a master in offering a sober perspective of human life.

Based upon his work I would like to present another way of working with people in distress and suffering. It is called 'value analyses', since it is a personal value oriented, meaning centred way of dealing with the verbal relationship between the therapist and the client. Value analysis comprises self-experience in an existential perspective, which allows the client to become aware of personal issues beyond actual problems, situations and conditions, layers of psychological nature, emotional impairment and socio-cultural contextual issues.

Value analysis gives us a rather direct access to the spiritual dimension of a human being, securing the essence of existence, which is non-analysable, and at the same time offering the utmost respect for the humanness of the person involved since neither the person is subject of analyses.

Before I explain to you how value analyses works, I want to mention the people and work that put me on track. Without doubt, Frankl's famous lecture on 'arguments for a tragic optimism' (1983) is basic for the method. I also owe much to Robert Hutzell from the Veteran Hospital in Iowa. Without denying my original background, I mention F. Rosenzweig, A. J. Heschel, E. Levinas, A. Szekeres, K. H. Miskotte and F. H. Breukelman, people close to people, persons of great wisdom who helped me with their insight and knowledge to develop this method of Logotherapy.

Working with people as a psychotherapist is different from working with people as a counsellor. As a psychotherapist I need to get to know the person first, to find out from what specific personal perspective this individual relates to life (c.f. Frankl, *Die Psychotherapie in der Praxis*, Vienna, 1947, p.VII, 104).

I mentioned that as a psychotherapist I would work differently than as a counsellor. Counselling is problem-related contact; psychotherapy however is existentially 'being with'. Many of our clients tell us 'You were the first person in my life who took me seriously - who treated me as a human being'. Value analysis is a way of getting right at the heart of existence, in opening up the opportunity to 'be with' the client as a human being.

1.1. Dimensions versus layers

Frankl's Existential Analysis opens up a perspective of dimensions rather than the usual layer-like schemes. A layer presupposes a distinct separation from another layer and leads us into working within the limits of the layer it-

self. Dimensions however are indirectly interrelated and offer a specific advantage.

According to Frankl human means to exist in a complex unity. The theoretical model behind this is called 'dimensional ontology'. The ontic is the dimension we share with things, plants and animals. Ontic however is both physical and sociological - in terms of body, gender, group; this is conditional.

The psychological is where we surpass mere material being and where a different dimension opens up. We know we have a past, we are aware of a future and we are consciously living at the borderline in times, called 'present'. We express ourselves in the psychological dimension without ever being ourselves what we express; we may be partially known through expression and by expression. Emotion, language, science and culture are vehicles to express or translate - but it remains limited to situation and condition. Who we as persons are is unconditional, therefore it is in a different dimension in which we exist. Put otherwise, Frankl argues that our parents provide us with a body and a psychological capacity.

When it comes to answer the question who each of us actually is, the word 'person' arrives. Person cannot be reduced or deduced; it is a unique ontological phenomenon. Person is what makes us uniquely human. Consequently, we cannot identify a person by bodily or psychological phenomena. We may be able to collectivise people and itemise separate individual traits.

Here Frankl came up with the first of his two dimensional - ontological rules.

The rule says: A phenomenon (the person) projected from its own realm into a lower or different realm, will provide different projections. My bodily condition may be (!) an expression of my personal existence, but does not have to be. We all know the spontaneous reaction to someone in a wheelchair being pushed by someone else. We all tend to turn to the pusher rather than to the sitter, because we are made to believe that physical impairment goes along with psychological impairment or even human value. Frankl however showed that even in the case of a psychotic individual, psychosis does not say anything about the existence of the person behind psychoses. Psychoses is blocking (from physical causes and psychological reactions) our direct access (in terms of trans-subjective being) to a relation with the person, as well as blocking the person behind the psychoses to directly relate to us.

Unless and until we ourselves as non-psychotic

individuals dare to go along with the psychoses to look for and find tiny but definite proof of the unharmed spiritual person behind the biopsychological problem. So, if we would just add the projections (the bodily and psychological impairments) - as we usually do, we would overlook and hurt the person. One of the consequences of this is, that we have to admit what we fear the most, which is twofold:

a) suffering is the most difficult condition in which a human being is challenged to remain human,

b) the spiritual 'is there' and cannot be hurt, cannot fall ill.

1.2. Arguments for a tragic optimism

Frankl summarised the human condition psychologically when he said that all people of all times and ages, sex and religion actually face six inevitable situations. No one can escape transience, no one escapes suffering, we all owe life something beyond ourselves. However, we all derive our ability to be humane from life itself in terms of confidence, hope and love. The person one is, is in the centre of these experiential facts of life. Each person, being unique and irrepeatable, translates to these facts of life differently. In other words, the items representing these six situations in life, are the existential values one lives with, even if one lives with these situations in an unconscious way.

What matters in psychotherapy is to help our clients to get away from the hyperreflection and hyperintention linked with the presented problem, in order to find a way to change (C.f. A. Längle, Viktor Frankl's Logotherapie in der Praxis, München, 1988, p. 103).

Uwe Boeschmijer has pointed out that the psychological - emotional dimension is the level of conflicts between what individuals subconsciously use in terms of learned behaviour and existential frustration. The existential vacuum (Frankl, 1925) is experienced as the inner emptiness arriving from an unconscious blocking of vocational - humane life purposes, and feels like meaninglessness related to present behaviour and thought.

Apart from the tragic triad, each human being is instantly, however unconsciously, reminded of an optimistic triad. The existential values in the optimistic triad have been summarised way before psychotherapy ever existed and they appear to be ubiquitous as well. We used to call them faith, hope and love.

Faith, confidence, is the awareness of self-worth, the amount of the self trusting life itself

to be an unconditional possibility for human dignity.

Hope is equivalent to the awareness that life trusts me with itself, unconditionally.

Love, the unselfishly sharing pinnacle of human being, is the unconditional 'yes' of a person, no matter the situation or condition in which the person has to live.

Both the optimistic and the tragic triad are integrated, since the definition of human being according to Frankl is 'unity in complexity' (Frankl, 1946). The person is the integrating one that unites and lives the ultimate challenge and task of becoming a humane being.

1.3. *The first steps in the procedure;*

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After having listened to the presentation of the problem, I ask my client to try to help me out in finding out a very important piece of information about himself/herself.


I would like to find the information apart from the problem. Technically I urge my client to de-reflect instantly; that is to self-distance from the emotional-psychological issue at hand; however I don't use those terms. 'I would like to know what it is that you find really important in your life' is the phrase I use most of the times. I ask my clients to list six overall important subjects concerning his/her very own life. The order of

the listing does not matter, it should be done quickly, just as the subjects come into awareness.

The second step is to tick the three most important subjects from the list of six. The third step is to tick again from the three most important ones the ultimately important one.

The fourth step is to give a minus to one of the three listed, but not ticked subjects. I now ask my clients to draw a star from two triangles. To put the word 'I' in the middle of the star. To put the ultimate subject on top of the triangle pointing upwards. To put the subject marked minus on top of the triangle pointing downwards. Then I ask my client to add the two ticked items left at the base corners of the triangle pointing upwards, and to subsequently fill in the two unmarked subjects at the base of the triangle pointing downwards. Most of the times the client is surprised, since there are items that do not correspond with the problem at hand. If I would have asked about the subjects in which the client values himself/herself, I would have received a problem-centred answer, which technically is hyperintention and hyperreflection.

In the above used procedure however there are at least two, often even four items that are not linked to the problem.



(THE BASIC EXISTENTIAL ID)

The client appears to be within the star, from 'the person' reaching out and allowing to be touched by life through situations and conditions, challenges and tasks. Powerful in the transcending 'yes' of love, grappling with weakness in the basic condition of transience. So we start with the best possible positive outlook.

We may say: 'My problem 'is', but in spite of 'it' I

say my 'yes' to life, I do 'exist' (C.F. Frankl, ...trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen, Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager, 1946-1999 ['Men's search for Meaning']).

What we find here is the possibility to remobilize individual human dignity, enabling the client to self face suffering, death and what he/she still owes life, something or someone else. In between we enable the awareness in ourselves that there is a possibility to help both victims and perpetrators without a moral judgement, since 'guilt' is in fact nothing but a task still to be undertaken.

The six values we found are in fact **attitudinal values**; they are **personalised** synonyms of the ubiquitous, and they appear in terms of task and challenge, freedom and responsibility, empowerment and sacrifice. They each and all together reflect the actual relationship of the person to ubiquitous aspects of life itself.

Imbalance caused by ticking (valuing) subjects may be found in the following step. I ask my client to write down a sentence, beginning with 'I' and dealing with all the six subjects in the ticked order. Now we have found the business mission of this particular individual, since subjects are linked by adverbs, adjectives and verbs. Adjectives and adverbs are valuations, verbs are potential actions (see below). This is how the client perceives himself/herself within the widest possible context called 'life'.

It may help the therapist to think about a diagnosis, especially when the therapist invites the client to turn the triangles until it feels okay, to rewrite the sentence until the client is able to say: 'This is who I am'; that is; existentially this is what really matters to me when it comes to questions about meaning and dignity in my life.

This is what I actually take responsibility for, this is about my freedom as a person in spite of my history as an individual and my present circumstances'.

The actual problem presented by the client may well be expression of the spiritual wrestle, appearing under the 'clinical image' of a neurosis. We all know that whatever diagnosis will come up, we will never 'have' this person as a unique human being, and we all know that the trial and error versions of integrating and expressing the spiritual into reality will always be a temporal matter.

In terms of the value exercise we may be able to find one or more negatives corresponding behavioural and thus bio-psycho-social reactive patterns.

1. DESTRUCTIVENESS

PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING LETHAL AND SUICIDAL.

2. DISORGANISATION

PSYCHOTIC STRAY, DISORDERS IN COGNITIVE CONTROL OF THINKING, SPEECH AND MOTOR.

3. DYSPHORIA

DISTURBANCES, DISORDER IN ALERTNESS AND EXPRESSIONS OF ANGER.

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when I forgot all about them (C.f. Frankl, the 'optimism of the past', past is true reality, in: The unheard cry for meaning, psychotherapy and humanism, 1978 p. 104, 110). I realised in the present by acting upon my existential values and I add to the harvest, which is my past.

Similarly, even in responses and reactions, I could not have responded or reacted *apart* from my existential values, since these values are the personal elements of what I perceived to be the ultimate meaning of my being.

There is no straight path towards this meaning; since I cannot determine conditions and situations inside relations without denying the other the right to exist, or outside relations without being a solipsist. In the latter case I would have been born on the wrong planet.

2.1. Refining the values

If the existential values are part of the humanly integrated expression as a person, each of these values can be traced in the individual past. Events during which each optimistic angle appeared are known as joy, safety and happiness.

Experienced joy, safety and happiness are in each life, be they scarce.

It is upon what we experience from others and by our own acts that we notice afterwards the unconditional 'yes' from life itself on our being. In terms of language: qualifications like adverbs and adjectives reveal the melody of the tune and the art of the performer.

We know from behavioural sciences and from biology that linking our memory to the positive, optimistic will also reproduce the chemistry by which the body and psyche 'feels empowerment'. Although the *factual* reproduction of situations, conditions and relationships is not possible since neither time nor change can be made undone, the client can be invited to undertake the effort of facing the present condition and situation and to state possible acts that will facilitate the dignity and meaning of former situations, conditions and relationships.

It is obvious that if one is a traumatised refugee one cannot do as if the situation, the condition and the relationships were different- but, before one became a refugee, before one suffered the traumatic one had a life and one still lives within the present that will never last and with the past that will not be erased by the trauma itself.

There is a future that needs to be realised as long one is alive. If the trauma is not to win, if the wounds are not to destine the future, one owes oneself, the lost loved ones, one's children, the children of other people, life itself the

4. DEVIANCY

IMPULSIVE ACTING - OUT, BREAKING OF SOCIAL NORMS IN RELATION TO AUTHORITY

5. DEPENDENCY

SYMBIOTIC, NOT BEING ABLE TO BE INDEPENDENT OF FAMILY, RELATIVE (CLUSTER FAMILY), NEUROTIC DISCREPANCY IN SELF-AWARENESS.

6. DISILLUSION

DEMORALISATION, BOREDOM, ALIENATION AS EXPRESSIONS OF DISBELIEF IN ONE'S OWN CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVENESS, JUSTICE IN SOCIETY, MEANINGLESS CONDITIONS AND SITUATIONS, DESPAIR ABOUT MEANING IN LIFE IN GENERAL.

2. The search for possible meaning

Possible meaning is depending on the personalised, attitudinal values.

The basic existential ID that we found in the value-exercise is the window for dignifying psychological exploration. The individualisation of personalised valuable relations towards life are - du to the past - experience, emotion, - thought and action.

In the past I expressed myself in various conditions and situations in which I unconsciously and most of the times unwarily translated my existence into being linked to what I came to do. These expressions can be traced in terms of negative and positive.

Experiences, emotions, acts in my past will remain, even when I am no longer alive, even

change towards a humane world. This is definitely not the collective burden of capitalism or any other '-ism' for that matter. The paradoxical but principal gain in trauma is that the traumatised individual consciently knows what it takes to be a humane person, where absolute boundaries are when it comes to dignity and meaning. To witness inhumanity is an appeal to act in humanity itself, to suffer indignity and injustice is an appeal to never forget but also to not surrender even if temporal submission secured both one's own life and that of others.

Temporal submission secured the tale and its consequences, the knowledge of the recipe called evil appeals to be taken with the past victim into the grave, to be taken out of this world and not being propagated in any way.

The other consequence of surviving is the task and challenge to find the liberty of the past for change in the present, in favour of the future of mankind.

Even in suffering we are empowered, although psychologically and emotionally we don't feel fine. We may loose limbs, we may loose health, but we cannot deliver ourselves from having to solve the calls of life for change and improvement in terms of dignity and meaning.

2.2. Actualising the values

As Frankl defines values as existential perspectives for concrete actions, values being the personalised and integrated relation with life and its unconditional meaning itself, we also need to look at the use of *verbs*. The listings of adjectives and adverbs being the listing of experiential values, is linked to the list of attitudinal values by acts - or in language, by verbs. Verbs are perspectives about human acts. Acts are the 'argumenta ad hominem ad situatonem' (c.f. Frankl, *Trotzdem hat das leben einen Sinn*, 1985).

In fact, a Logotherapy based upon the existential value analyses, helps to recapture the very grammar of the person's heart that allows this person to change in freedom and by responsible acts. The acts are expressions of the person, I become accordingly to my acts.

My body stays alive in breathing, taking *some of the available* oxygen out of the available air and giving back some carbon dioxide that helps plants to produce new oxygen, which they in return add to the air that we all share breathing.

What else and more is air meaning to me? My body knows exactly and acts without my intentional awareness. Would I myself, my spirit, not?

What about humanness, dignity and meaning? Would this be different, so different that it would not be possible for me to bring this into reality? Would I end my life happy and humane in revenge, in denial, in bitterness? And even if I never understood what happiness meant, but I did spend my life in whatever I could to procure humanness, dignity and meaning, would not I at least be happy that I did? Would not you yourself want this to become you starting here and now?

INTRODUCING AN EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

by Ian Rory Owen

Part 1 basic phenomenological theory and research

ABSTRACT What is often referred to as the existential approach to counselling and psychotherapy may be defined as the application of existential-phenomenological philosophy towards psychotherapeutic ends, in which individual practitioners choose how to apply their readings of the leading authors. The first of this two-part exposition introduces a form of "experiential" philosophy, called phenomenology, a regular experiential method that is in many ways antithetical to the conventional scientific approach. This first paper concentrates on one of the many successive definitions of phenomenology given by Husserl, the philosopher of science, in 1927, with help from his ex-student Heidegger. In the second paper, phenomenology is brought to bear on human experience, Heidegger in *Being and time*, who added it to the writings of the earlier existentialists Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, to produce existential psychology and philosophy. Also in the second part, three forms of existential therapy are briefly mentioned. This first paper introduces a handful of key ideas for counselling psychologists, and illustrates how philosophical work is an inherent part of life, as well as the production and use of psychological knowledge.

Overview

An existential-phenomenological approach to psychotherapy and research begins with the meeting of three prior strands of philosophy. First of all, existential philosophy is part of a reaction to rationalism and the grand systems of philosophy such as those of Hegel and Kant. But phenomenology also appears partly in response to Immanuel Kant's "pure reason", a drive towards the science of science, and takes on board the work of philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The second strand on which existential therapy is built are the themes of the existential writers Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The third strand is the radical inquiry into experiences called phe-

nomenology, which was pioneered by Brentano, Husserl and Heidegger.

Phenomenology has important implications for all science, psychology and psychotherapy, yet it is largely unknown outside of the academic spheres of continental philosophy (Kearney, 1984). It is carried out in a rational, investigative manner, and studies awareness, aims, meaning, and personal and social experience. Phenomenology gives equal attention to both the personal and social aspects of communal life. The branch of social psychology called social constructionism is based on the intersubjective creation of human worlds (Owen, 1992, 1994). It is not enough to say that the individual is comprised by the social, as the social is also comprised of individual actions. The word intersubjectivity is used to refer to the co-constitution of all aspects of human worlds, of self and other. The core notion of intersubjectivity is also known as "being-with" in a "with-world", terms invented by Heidegger to describe the contextual responses of humanity. The phenomenological methods, defined below, are ways of changing from an active engagement with the world and the object in question, to a reflection upon it. They are also processes of data gathering that try not to disrupt the data by its method of value-judgement, interpretation and type of thinking. Spiegelberg defines phenomenology succinctly:

"...the direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions." (Spiegelberg, 1970, p.810).

Three European psychiatrists, Jaspers, Boss and Binswanger, were the first to apply the work of Husserl and Heidegger to make an existential approach to therapy and psychopathology. The psychiatrists produced existential therapy after attempting to use existential concepts to make sense of the subjective phenomena of mental illness. Since then, applications of existential psychology and philosophy have influenced counselling, psychology, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. But generally, the original procedures and beliefs of existential philosophy and phenomenology remain obscure. The existential view is also a critique of research and therapy based on mechanical metaphors, statistics and insufficiently rigorous models for human science. Existential-phenomenology claims a more reliable and accurate basis for building an acausal, non-

reductionistic and non-reifying philosophical psychology for understanding human nature. This is based on induction, drawing general inferences from particular instances, and grounding in a priori essences, by first of all creating pure descriptions of actual sense experience.

Also, philosophy is relevant to counselling and therapy because everyone has a philosophy of human nature, even if it has not been made fully explicit. Therapists have a philosophy of how to act in the sessions, and these rationales must not go unscrutinised. Also a psychology of counselling must scrutinise its own position, as well as those of other possible approaches, to lay down firm roots that are founded on something of substance. It needs to design methods that are most suited to the nature of its subject and the most important factors it wishes to study. In the discussions below, readers will be able to note that the phenomenological approach has similarities and contrasts with current psychology. Phenomenology is argued as being more appropriate for the psychology of counselling and psychotherapy. This viewpoint is in opposition to approaches which have their emphasis on causality, and the omission of philosophy in assessing truth claims. This debate is as old as conventional psychology also (Wundt, 1904; Brentano, 1973). Brentano's work of 1874, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is a critique of the type of psychology which is the forerunner of Wundt's *The Principles of Physiological Psychology*, also published in 1874, and this split helps to define the traditional differences between the phenomenological approach and the natural science approach.

Brentano and Husserl

Phenomenology is the regularised turn to consciousness of Husserl, which was largely built on the work of his teacher Franz Brentano (1838-1917). It is difficult to characterise all of Brentano's areas of interest, but his main contribution was to reintroduce the idea of the intentionality of consciousness, which he used as a starting point for all investigations (Brentano, 1973). Intentionality is claimed to be the key characteristic of subjectivity, that the majority of sense data is of or about something or someone, even if this is "real" and intelligible for only one person. Intentionality also implies that all perceptions have meaning. Intentionality is the essence of perception, awareness, experience, and attention. It always refers to the content of consciousness, the "directed-

ness" of consciousness, the ways in which consciousness interprets that which it perceives. For instance, we are not aware of pressure waves in the air, but of sounds that we recognise intelligibly as the sounds of something specific. We do not see reflected light waves, but may recognise someone we know, in a meaningful perspective against a background.

Brentano had a substantial influence on the psychology of his era. For instance, he taught Freud psychology and philosophy at Vienna University for four terms between 1874 and 1876. Although this influence has been played down by Freud's biographer, Ernest Jones (Barclay, 1964). Freud attended lectures by Brentano on the directedness of consciousness, the association of ideas, primary association, memory and dream phenomena (McGrath, 1986). Freud (born 1856) also took Brentano's lectures on logic and the philosophy of Aristotle, and was much impressed by the material he studied. As an aside, Brentano also taught Carl Stumpf, the experimental psychologist, who called phenomenology a pre-science, as it comes before making any claims to knowledge (Spiegelberg, 1982, p. 61).

The word *epoche* was used within Greek philosophy to mean the suspension of judgment. Husserl used it in two ways, as a psychological *epoche*, or bracketing, to try and set aside assumptions in order to start again in describing what appears to pure psyche. He also used it for producing the "transcendental" attitude, see below. One version of Husserl's psychological method can be rendered in three steps. In an aim to embrace subjective phenomena without dogma or bias, phenomenological *epoches* are used for turning to sense data and describing psychological phenomena more fully. Phenomenology turns away from current a priori assumptions, theory and expectations, and attempts to describe the subjective experiences of self or other. It does not hypothesize or impose itself onto another's understanding. It limits itself to producing data about actual views of the world.

Theoretical overview

It is perhaps easiest to introduce Edmund Husserl's philosophical critique of science and the human sciences by explaining its four sets of statements below which are presented in separate sections below. Below steps 1 and 3 study the a priori essences of their subject. In this way preparatory steps before empirical investigations will include all theoretical, methodological, epistemological considerations. These are

oriented towards the elucidation of the shape and regular features of the subject to be studied, as it is in itself. The phenomenologically-grounded psychology and philosophy are then more able to discern the truth of psyche and the world. Two extra processes are included, between steps 2 and 1, and 4 and 3, as each study includes a method of checking empirical findings against the original considerations.

1) Phenomenological pure psychology is a discussion of the necessary considerations for making a psychology. It tries to find psychological essences of the a priori of consciousness which comprise awareness in the senses and language, plus the awareness of changes in these through time. These essences are those without which thought cannot come to reach its object. Pure psychology is a precursor to the next step in the Husserlian project.

2) A phenomenological empirical psychology is an actual investigation of experiences and meanings and their original context and process of unfoldment. The aim is to capture the nature of the consciousness of others as it appears to oneself. By trying to clear and turn to psychological events as they appear to self and other only.

3) After steps 1 and 2 above, a third philosophical science runs in parallel. Starting a different set of philosophical considerations about the truth and meaning of any required prerequisites or necessary discussions concerning how a study may be grounded in experiences of recognising its truth or falsity, clarity or incoherence, as it is within itself. Uses the transcendental reduction to change from the acceptance of everyday assumptions of reality to state of neutrality concerning them.

4) Finally, a fourth step of actual empirical philosophical investigation can take place.

Phenomenological psychology

In 1927 Husserl in conjunction with Martin Heidegger, 30 years his junior, produced a definition of his approach for *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Heidegger, 1977; Husserl, 1971). Heidegger earlier that year had published *Being and Time* which gives many conclusions about human nature, but omits most of the detailed phenomenological method and reasoning used in gaining the insights. Husserl in his 1927 manifesto laid out two disciplines, which together comprise the points which define the scope of phenomenological practice.

1) The first discipline is the creation of an a priori inductive and immanent *phenomenological*

pure psychology derived from a method that rejects all ready-made assumptions.

2) This is in order to create "the basic methodological foundation on which alone a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology can be established", and to reform all the human sciences (Husserl, 1971, p. 77).

Husserl wished to separate psychology from philosophy because each science must attend to its own true realm, which for psychological investigation is that of "pure" psyche. Where pure means having become like a pure mathematics and rejected all causal-biological effects as belonging to the realm of psychophysiology. One category error to be avoided is mistaking "impure" psyche for "pure" psyche. All the biological, physiological and neurochemical perspectives within psychology are quite rightly causal and deterministic, because their substrate is of that nature, the physical. Pure psychology studies only that which is psychological: ways of making meanings, relationships, personal and interpersonal phenomena.

Pure psychology also identifies the a priori essences on which psychology is built, and should be built. Husserl's pure psychology has much to do with working out and agreeing essences (adjective - eidetic), the definitive aspects, or key features on which the study of pure psyche should be based. This preliminary work establishes the conceptual categories and assumptions which enable psychology to operate as it does. The study of essences follows on from phenomenological descriptions of what consciousness is about. An essence is a quality which defines something as what it is, and not something else. The idea of essences is akin to naming, in that the most appropriate words and phrases are considered in their relation to the nature of the object that is being reflected on. The realm of the pure psyche is that of conscious awareness of objects, relations and choice. A pure psychology employs rationality to find the scope of the nature of the personal and the social. At the stage of data gathering phenomenology demands that no preference is given to the process of generalization over the specifics of any case. One feature of this method would be its attention to detail in referring to specific experiences:

"The specific experience of this house, this body, of a world as such, is and remains, however, according to its own essential content and thus inseparably, experience "of this house", this body, this world; this is so for every mode of consciousness which is directed towards an object." (Ibid, p.80).

For Husserl, the connection between his discipline and positivism is:

"If 'positivism' is tantamount to an absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the 'positive,' that is to say, on what can be seized upon originally, then we are the genuine positivists." (Husserl, 1982, p.39).

Any aspect of the psyche due to physiological causes is outside the scope of Husserl's pure psychology which does not assume causality. Specific inputs are not regarded as creating specific outputs. Although many people use such models to explain themselves and human actions in the world, this way of thinking is not considered representative of the actions of cause and effect within a community of psyches. The subject of cause and effect is broached afresh, to try and reconsider how interactive, aware and motivated human beings choose, because it is the nature of valuing and choosing certain outcomes and interpretations, that is part of the intersubjectivity and meaningfulness that phenomenologists wish to investigate. The word "cause" so often carries with it the assumption that something specific, perhaps already even well-known, has caused a choice to happen. For instance, in *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* Husserl was critical of Galileo's role in the history of science, because Galileo put his faith in the appropriateness of mathematical modelling (Husserl, 1970). The ensuing mistake has been to treat many subjects as capable of being mathematically modelled, which can give the impression that the model produced, becomes mistaken for the true nature of the subject in question. Also, it is much easier to reduce and represent a problem in mathematical notation, rather than grapple with how to understand a multi-faceted problem itself in the first place. The original situation may be exceedingly complicated, and so, if all the factors that might be present were taken into account, the overall model would be mathematically indeterminate. As a contrast, what is of interest to phenomenologists are the ways in which perceiving or knowing anything or anyone, turn chaotic, or unique experiences, into recognisable and regularised entities, via the processes of consciousness.

1. Bracketing (the psychological reduction)

Start afresh. Aim to set aside as much as possible of your current knowledge, expectations, assumptions and attitudes about your subject. Reject all assumptions of causation.

2. Turn to consciousness:

Reflection and description only

Reflect on your subject and describe your immediate experiences and impressions of it. Bring yourself back to describing it, if you find you have begun to intellectualize, theorize, guess or explain it. Just note what is there, and what it seems to be. Try and name all you experience about it. Do not prefer any description above any other, and treat all as unique occurrences at this stage of data gathering.

3. Phenomenological interpretation

Aim to find the nature of the things themselves: "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself". Neither exclude material that does not seem to fit, nor include that which you think should be present, but which is not. Try to identify the a priori, definitive qualities and key characteristics of the phenomena at hand. Try varying the features of the subject in your imagination to find which are most central. From this basis, psychological knowledge can be produced hesitantly, by categorising, decontextualising and generalising, moving away from the unique.

The pure psychology of therapy

A worked example should make some of the points above clearer: Both conventional psychology and phenomenological pure psychology take part in the production of valid psychological knowledge. For instance, a hundred views of "the same thing" are recognisable as being the same. Therefore, some process must be involved which links together these unique experiences, there must be some set of characteristics which denote it, and of these, some must be the most fundamental features which are present for its character to be recognisable at all.

An example should make the procedure above much clearer. For instance, when the phenomenological gaze is applied to psychotherapy research, it starts (1) by trying to lay aside all that is currently known about its usual starting points, methods and presuppositions. Describes (2) what appears to each researcher, without trying to interpret, add or subtract from what he or she experiences about these meetings. At a later stage (3) the a priori essences of awareness can be analyzed for the inherent patterns and relationships that they may have in themselves. As we shall see below, a further stage of transcendental doubt and variation can be applied to suspend current beliefs

about the existence and nature of therapy and therapy research, and three similar steps follow the same procedure. This can be done by imagining that psychotherapy does not exist at all, so you can look with naive eyes, at that which is called psychotherapy, in order to see what actually goes on there.

It can be seen that therapy research in a phenomenological style always starts from the personal, yet after discussion with others tries to find universal, a priori and eidetic aspects, that apply for all the meetings called psychotherapy. A pure psychology of therapy attends to the client-therapist pair, and would ground all aspects of meaning, relationships, aims and awareness, and the intersubjectivity of both participants. Accordingly, therapy is seen as a multidisciplinary subject and comprised of many overlapping areas, such as interpersonal perception, ethics, faith healing, psychopathology and the contributions of the human sciences. This qualitative psychology approach asks for descriptions to interview questions, and gives these a detailed semantic and conceptual analysis dependent on the interviewer using phenomenological methods to make and interpret the data. The phenomenological interviewer (Husserl 1977b, §45) can also elicit information about how therapists feel they are achieving and contributing to the relationship in certain ways.

- 1 Please describe what you think is effective therapy?
- 2 How do you recognise when this is occurring and what is this like?
- 3 What do you do at a first session?
- 4 What do you do if a new client wishes to leave therapy or misses an appointment?
- 5 What do you explain about the terms of therapy?
- 6 What do you think are the natures of good and bad mental health?
- 7 What general principles guide your interactions with clients and how do you recognise when these are happening?
- 8 Please define in interpersonal terms which you feel are effective and how you can recognise or create these conditions.

9 What do you think of your approach in comparison to other approaches?

10 How do you finish therapy, or know that clients have improved or got worse?

Furthermore, a phenomenological approach is self-reflexive in discussing the philosophical assumptions and foundations of a counselling psychology. A pure psychology approach to counselling psychology would be interested in working out how to make good quality interpretations that will be useful to practitioners. It would also identify the core nature of the work, find client's experiences in their own terms, and therapy in different styles. It would try and seek out which identifiable factors helped clients feel better, and emphasize the study of meaning in psychology.

Scientific transcendental philosophy

The second discipline Husserl founded is an empirical philosophy, a transcendental phenomenology which is based on a descriptive method and an a priori philosophical science derived from the method. 3) It is a return to the theme of the creation of verbal descriptions from personal experience, as the source and final test of all claims to knowledge (Husserl, 1977b). 4) Transcendental phenomenology is also the basis "for a rigorous scientific philosophy and... a methodical reform of all the sciences", (Husserl, 1971, p.77). This *transcendental* philosophical work is the application of doubt and the study of the essences of transcendental consciousness, its acts and objects. This transcendental phenomenology aims to find bases for knowledge that are beyond all doubt. This stage is called transcendental because it suspends all abstract transcendent claims about a reality other than that which constitutes the world with others, and so rejects all factual and empirical provisional results. Once this had been attained the scientific philosophy could begin by the direct transcendental perception of what exists, which could be born out or disputed by other phenomenologists.

This rejection of the assumption of existence of a quality is in addition to the three step method described above. This transcendental method is one of applying philosophical doubt to some state of affairs, or taken-for-granted hypothesis, so temporarily rendering it unbelievable, or disbelieved. It is the production of the transcendental attitude of scepticism. It is also hoped that this will form a regular "scientific" method for philosophers and psychologists, as it

produces a step by step method that can be used to doubt various assumptions and practices, and so scrutinise them in minute detail, seen as though for the first time, in their obvious truth; or as a relative step forwards; or as flawed but worthy attempts. By a slow process of elimination, and the establishment of qualitative methods for interpreting data, it was hoped to build an entirely fresh and perfectly self-reflexive experientially-based philosophy. After steps one to three above in the section on phenomenological psychology, in a similar manner, three further steps are added:

4. The transcendence of the actualities of the subject and the object and the loss of belief in the reality of the world and the belief in the existence of the self.

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The debate on which phenomenology focuses its opposing psychological and philosophical forms is relevant for several areas of psychology as a science, counselling psychology as a therapeutic practice, and for research into that practice. The first point to consider is the fundamentally different types of assertion that are being made in making, judging and using psychological knowledge. Often in psychology and therapy, a fundamental mistake is treating a theory as a metaphysical assertion. This mistake is one of mis-categorising provisional, relative or approximate knowledge, and mistaking it for absolute knowledge. When this mistake is imposed as an answer, it prevents the possibili-

ty of considering the data afresh, as though for the first time, and of taking the opportunity to check the rigour of founding assumptions, and currently accepted experimental methods and modes of interpretation.

Sciences are based on categories, aims, essences and concepts, and are oriented towards finding absolutes and effective insights into the true nature of their subject. Sciences have to provide methods and practices of thought which allow all the co-workers to orientate themselves, and so progress can occur for the profession. Relative and provisional results are only steps towards truths, and so sciences have to be able to distinguish between more and less effective methods and starting assumptions. Sciences are effective by providing a fixed method for ascertaining data, so that anybody who follows the steps can to agree or disagree the results of other practitioners.

Comparing pure to conventional psychology

In discussion, *first* of all, conventional psychology lacks a system of basic concepts founded on a philosophical analysis of the key essential features of intersubjective life. Such descriptive studies of psychological phenomena are primary, so that the following interpretation is oriented in the desired manner. For instance, the debate on the purpose, method, ethics and consequences of IQ testing in schools could have been completed, before any testing was designed and introduced. The human meaning and implications of actions must always be born in mind, or a morally void, psychological technology will arise, based on the assumptions of science, losing the human consequences and implications of its procedures. As the science of science, phenomenology criticises conventional psychology, for instance, for not being sufficiently scientific, rational or open minded.

Secondly, conventional psychology seeks to experimentally quantify the relations between "objective" stimuli and "objective" responses; and usually ignores the subjective viewing of stimuli and the experience of responding. This distinction between objective and subjective is blurred by phenomenological questioning, which emphasizes the subjective nature of all experience. Phenomenology critiques a misplaced objectivism, which occurs in reducing an interhuman situation, to "objective" scores, which are then processed by computer to produce results deemed to be scientific and independent of the interests of the researcher. The problem with the terms *subjective* and *objective*

is that they stand as short-hand for two key concepts, which split up events, and order them under two banners, subjectivity and objectivity, which are then neatly opposed and deemed mutually exclusive.

Third, phenomenological psychology describes how and what consciousness perceives. It studies exemplary cases of fundamental subjective-objective phenomena. As each academic discourse lays down assumptions and premises for its legitimate narratives, what psychologists *actually measure* needs to be investigated. For instance, is it possible to call a procedure "scientific" which starts with subjective rating? Are not such experimental methods bound to measure something other than what they intend to? Methods which lack sufficient logical rigour and forethought should not be accepted as academic discourse. So perhaps the term scientific should be kept solely for the hard sciences, and not used at all in the human sciences. Phenomenology helps researchers posit new views, by including information which may lie outside the current field of study. In areas of science where little progress has occurred, the beliefs about what works, or is "true", congeal to become a set orthodoxy. Therefore, phenomenology is one way of challenging sedimented assumptions and trying to find out what is really true. Phenomenology is about searching, exploring and questioning lived experience as it appears, in attempting to find better and more adequate explanations. This method of clarifying experiences and detecting assumptions can be used in research of all kinds.

According to pure psychology, knowledge derived from impure methods, received wisdom, assumptions and of an impure psyche has to be set aside. This would reject all behavioural, animal and biological approaches. It would also reject all miscategorising enterprises, because these do not adequately model the actual personal-social events, meaningful and valued, conscious goal-oriented choices. For instance, quantitative research, IQ and personality testing miss the point in trying to establish a numerical relation between a supposed small number of identifiable "objective" influences, and "objectively" measurable outcomes. Phenomenological psychology refutes this and concentrates on describing intersubjectivity, and comparing and discussing what is most important.

Pure psychology aims to increase understanding and correct insight into human nature by trying to capture the understandings and per-

spectives of others, as they see them, and tries to minimise the effect of translating their views incorrectly. The form of interpretation that is required has been called *emic*, as it is about the understanding of the other; in opposition to *etic* understanding, which refers to making clear the understanding, or conceptual framework that researchers already have. This direction is clear in Heidegger when he states that phenomenology is "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself", (Heidegger, 1962, p.58). Which I render as an attempt to find the nature or essences of things in themselves, which starts descriptively, at the appearances of things, and looks for their truest nature.

Starting point, aims and therapy

Husserl's 1927 definition contains within it several basic terms and aims to orient those who would like to participate in its project. These points also orient existential-phenomenological therapy and psychology in specific directions which need to be mentioned, before the second part of this exposition on the details of practice. The starting points are "elementary intentionalities", the awareness of goal-seeking, verbal and non-verbal sense data. Some elementary intentionalities are: thinking, judging, feeling, valuing, perceiving, recalling, fearing. Teleological intentionalities are: willing, hoping, choosing, striving, directional and purposeful behaviour. Phenomenological psychology finds the essences of these intentional acts by examining the key features of each.

Three more basic aims, in the application of phenomenology to living, are to attempt to find a priori, prerequisites that enable something to be the case, and "absolute norms" (Ibid, p. 88). The purpose of this is to find the a priori of the experiences of "I," "we," "consciousness," "the objectivity of consciousness," and therewith mental being as such', (op cit). This part of an overall project to find "wordly meaning" (Ibid, p. 83), the meaning that a person finds in their world. This is in the same sense of "world", as the term "object relations" in psychoanalysis.

In phenomenological terminology, Husserl states that when intentional awareness meets with intentional awareness, it produces new intentional awareness, which can be taken as a model for the production of new knowledge about self, other, and the nature of the world. Also, he valued the role of teleology so much, that he wrote that there is "no other way of contemplating the world than the teleological", (Ibid, p.89/90), which means that all understandings

are teleological. He also comments that a main objective is to find "primordial teleologies", but this is not further explained. Perhaps he means to find childhood, shared and panhuman aims which ground all current adult experience.

As regards intersubjectivity, Heidegger comments on "co-existence" and "co-felt empathy" (Heidegger, 1977, p.117); and Husserl refers to "correlative intentional constitution", (Husserl, 1971, p.87) of self and other in the production of a communal "stream of consciousness". This interrelation, of self and other, plays a part in all aims and aspects of finding the "genuine human life" (Ibid, p. 89) in being guided by a logic which will orient the human Spirit towards living in "truth and genuineness" (op cit). I interpret this as meaning that self development and positive change cannot take place alone, as we are not alone in the world. Positive change can only take place to the extent that the social context can accept the changes. Also, it directly implies that we should clarify what we currently do, and in what direction we would like to orient ourselves. Not only would a Husserlian therapy request that clients and therapists accept multiple perspectives on "the same thing", and recognise the effect of reinterpretations. When phenomenology is applied to life it encourages all who participate to become rigorous and more open minded psychologists and philosophers, in all aspects of the everyday.

The direction in which Husserl's work directs therapy and psychology is to produce understanding of oneself and others. One aim is to find the most persistent habits of thought, behaviour, interpretation, aims and the constitution of a personal world, and all the interrelated aspects of this (Ibid, p.82). The preferred method is to use the transcendental epoche to suspend one's current belief in oneself, and so look again at oneself or the existence of another. This transcendental change of attitude towards self or other occurs naturally without phenomenology, and can have either a negative or positive effect. When it is negative we become ontologically insecure, lack self-confidence, view ourselves or aspects of ourselves as foreign, and this change is active in depersonalisation, alienation and dissociation. Changes in the transcendental attitude may enable some new facet of ourselves to come into awareness, something which we had overlooked, forgotten or never contemplated before.

Conclusion

Phenomenology has had some of its greatest acceptance and applications in psychology and sociology (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Its influence can be noted in the branch of social psychology called social construction, a form of intersubjective psychology. Also, psychoanalysis has been influenced via the Freudian connection, which is mentioned in the second part on the implications for the practice of therapy.

Martin Heidegger used phenomenology to analyze human life and produced existential psychology and philosophy. Medard Boss and others adapted the same principles in producing existential psychotherapy. There are also some existential psychologists who use descriptive and qualitative methods (Van Kaam, 1966; Ihde, 1977, 1986). Phenomenology asserts that all objectivity originates from a world of intersubjective relations. When reductive science is applied to the irreducibility of consciousness, it is assumed that it is able to explain its nature in an "even-handed", neutral manner, where it is possible to exclude the values of the scientist. The scientific gaze skews data along the lines of its own interest. But, according to the phenomenological view, the scientific cart must not be put before the phenomenological horse, as data gathering must reflect the nature of the subject under consideration, rather than the interests of the researchers.

One consequence of phenomenology is a reminder that all knowledge is human made, and not timeless or unchanging. Rather, any methods of study have a history that can be traced back to a certain point when an innovation became established within a community. Phenomenology could form the basis for many kinds of research as it helps to foster an attitude of questing for new information. It is an attempt to promote and sustain an open-minded, investigative attitude, and so it can profoundly influence any area of study. But only if the participants are willing to lay aside their current ideas and begin to look again. It can be concluded that, in short, all human knowledge is achieved from a certain perspective, by emphasizing some aspects, and de-emphasizing others.

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Part 2 theory for practice

ABSTRACT Part one of this paper concentrated on phenomenological theory and research. This second section seeks to describe how existential-phenomenological therapy developed and how the concepts apply in sessions. This direction for therapy could be called making conscious the preconscious, in the production of new information by reinterpreting the same scenes and experiences. This approach is compared to the psychoanalytic style of working. The existential-phenomenological approach of Boss, a key existential writer, whose work evolved from Heidegger's reworking of

Husserl and a critique of Freud. But much detail is omitted in the aim of providing a succinct overview. This paper shows part of the sources of counselling and humanistic psychotherapy in the existential critique of psychoanalysis.

The existential writers

This second paper briefly takes readers through some of the concepts of three of the most important existential psychotherapists. The main body of the paper begins with the applications made by three existential psychiatrists, and later concentrates on the definition made by the Swiss, Medard Boss (1963, 1979). The field being introduced is complex so I can only sketch its outline here.

Several concepts of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) were taken by Heidegger to provide a basis for existential thought. One was dread, existential anxiety that is without any real object, but is a reaction to the perception of choice and freedom (Kierkegaard, 1944, 1988; Poole & Stangerup, 1989). In existential anxiety, Kierkegaard theorised that people become conscious of their own responsibility for their intentions, choices and actions. Existential anxiety arises from the contemplation of choice in general, and an awareness of the multitude of possibilities that are open to us, because of anomie, the normlessness of plural societies.

Existential anxiety is assumed to be a motivating force which arouses strong defences, in the denial of death anxiety and the fear of freedom, by the selection of defensive choices, which is an aspect of inauthenticity. Kierkegaard was also concerned with individuality, and what can be considered as being one's own. His writings also include the themes of dread and despair of oneself, in confronting a Nothingness which cannot be filled. Kierkegaard also argued that in special moments certain truths about human nature are revealed. Kierkegaard believed that we are each individually responsible for our own mental state and our way of relating with others. Kierkegaard also believed that what is most characteristic of human nature is the ability to choose. He commented on the link between dread, and the freedom and responsibility of choice:

"Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself... when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty." (Kierkegaard, 1944, p.55).

Martin Heidegger

The most famous writer who developed existential thought and applied phenomenology to human being was Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). He was prolific, his major existential-phenomenological work *Being and time* is now only the second of the 79 volumes of his complete works (the Gesamtausgabe, Steiner 1992). A major tension exists between the two fundamental sides of existential-phenomenology and a quest to understand Being in *Being and time*. The tension arises, because phenomenology tries to assume nothing without a sustained discussion and analysis of the usage of terms in context. However, Heidegger's existential-phenomenology has a small number of assumptions and focuses which define its characteristics. It is Heidegger who most clearly and vividly brought together Husserl's ideas on pure psychology and transcendental philosophy. *Being and time* continues the phenomenological psychological and philosophical projects (Owen, 1994a, b). The characteristic existential motifs are intersubjectivity, temporality, individuality, meaning, death, anxiety, ethics, guilt, choice, and the search to find the key essences of human nature. It is argued that on this ground that any qualitative or quantitative psychology, therapy or human science should be based.

Heidegger saw the supreme question of philosophy beginning with, and attending to, the miracle of existence (rather than there being nothing) and he was in awe of this. Only humans can understand and ask questions about Being, and the meaning of Being, and his method was founded on Husserl's phenomenology. Being is used in two senses (1) the absolute truth of the nature of things in themselves, and (2), the common aspect of everything that exists. It might be a clumsy use of English, but a better rendition is to call the second usage Being-ness, the single character or essence of all that exists. All particular beings are aspects of Being, the universe, everything, including ourselves. Heidegger also commented on the forgetting of Being and its importance for all successive discussions; and conversely, what it means for those who acknowledge Being.

Heidegger searched for the meaning of Being by first analysing human being. He used his development of phenomenology to uncover what he felt were fundamental categories of human existence. When Heidegger analyzed dread, the objectless anxiety of Kierkegaard, he found that the most fundamental aspect of humanity is care. Cohn comments that Heidegger used the word care with a more general

sense of involvement (Cohn, 1984, p. 313). Heidegger is pointing out that one of the most characteristic aspects of human nature is that it is always involved in times, places and people, past, present and future.

Heidegger's "hermeneutic" phenomenology analyzed experiences of immediate subjectivity, the mutual interrelatedness of human socially-made worlds; guilt and temporality; the involvement in existence through time. He concentrated on interpreting the meaning of phenomena "in themselves" and of finding hidden, disguised, forgotten or concealed truths. I shall briefly introduce a series of interlinked concepts from the existential view. First, the term Da-sein is made up of two German words placed together: there-to be, or there-being. This juxtaposition aims to convey the immediacy and contextuality of all experience. It conveys the importance of being involved in everyday life, with ordinary and mundane events, and so tries to prevent empty abstractions and rationalizations.

The similar term in-der-Welt-sein, being-in-the-world has the connotation of the irreducibility of human existence. Any analysis of Da-sein therefore tries to find the leitmotifs that run through a person's world, and can be gained through the acts of reflection that therapy promotes. Da-sein's being-in-the-world is an intersubjective being in a "with-world", or mit-welt, part of an intersubjective shared existence. A consequence of this interrelatedness is that there must be an openness to unknown new experiences, anxiety and changing interpretations, as sessions continue. A main theme in Heidegger's presentation of existential-phenomenology is stressed by him in the changing self-reflexive awareness and relations that humans have about themselves:

"Da-sein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Da-sein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." (Heidegger, 1962, p.69).

In Heidegger's presentation, anxiety and guilt are central to his perspective and can be said to exist in three forms (Cohn 1997): *First*, a real or ordinary sense of guilt for misdeeds, and signal anxiety in the presence of real danger. *Second*, there is neurotic guilt and anxiety, which may be resolved, and is sometimes an influx of the existential variety. And *last*, existential versions of the two. Neurotic anxiety may also be a reaction of existential anxiety that has been misrecognised. Neurotic anxiety is minimi-

sed by defences and symptoms, which close off choices and lessen the risks inherent in living.

The difference between existential guilt and neurotic guilt, is that in the existential form it is believed that people owe it to themselves and others to own themselves and participate to their fullest potential in life's ever changing patterns. Existential anxiety and guilt are directly linked to inauthenticity - the falling, or running away from the possibility of authenticity which creates a sense of debt that always remains and is founded: "*on the basis' of a primordial Being-guilty*", (Heidegger, 1996, p.262).

Existential guilt concerns how persons spend their life. On the other hand, neurotic guilt is compulsive and misplaced. Existential guilt concerns the preference for denying the human capacity to make authentic choices, and how people could become their own masters. However, existential guilt can only be acknowledged, it can never be overcome.

Comparison with psychoanalysis

From the perspective of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, of which existential therapy is a critique, existential theory may seem radical and iconoclastic, but it is not wild. It is therefore, perhaps easiest to introduce this practice in comparison to the terms of psychoanalysis. Four things can be said of the similarities and differences between psychoanalysis and the Daseinsanalysis approach of Medard Boss: There are aspects which remain, are modified aspects, those viewpoints and behaviours which are disallowed in the production of this minimalist and permissive relationship. Finally, there are those which belong solely to existential practice. In general, existential therapy has much respect for psychoanalysis, but critiques many of its most cherished assumptions. Existential practice has no rigid rules and mistrusts rigid theory, which could blind therapists to the particulars of individual clients, and so prevents them giving out a standard gloss. The four columns below summarise this comparison.

- * REMAINING MODIFIED
- * AVOIDANCE DEFERRED ACTION
- * CREATIVE SILENCE DEVELOPMENTAL DELAY
- * DEFENCE INTERPRETATION
- * DENIAL INTROJECTION
- * FREE ASSOCIATION OBJECT RELATIONSHIP
- * FREE FLOATING ATTENTION ORGAN NEUROSIS/

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- * PRECONSCIOUS WORKING THROUGH
- * DISALLOWED EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTS
- * COUNTERTRANSFERENCE *ALETHEIA*
- * NEUTRALITY AUTHENTICITY
- * OBJECTIVITY BEING-IN-THE-WORLD/*DA-SEIN*
- * PROJECTION BRACKETING/*EPOCHE*
- * PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION CHOICE
- * SPLITTING THOUGHT & EMOTION INTERSUBJECTIVITY
- * TRANSFERENCE IMAGINATIVE VARIATION
- * UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONS TEMPORALITY,

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In the consulting room for instance, this view concentrates on the intersubjective quality of therapists' aims and intentional awareness about clients and their aims; intermingled with clients' awareness and aims about therapists. Heidegger turned to the Greek word *aletheia*, un-hiddenness, which for him portrayed the unfoldings of meaning through time. Understanding can be pictured as moving through a series of rooms by crossing new thresholds. Each room is a new phase of understanding. Each prior understanding is replaced by opening the next door. The experiences usually named transference and counter-transference are subsumed under the existential heading of intersubjectivity, the description of the "co-felt empathy" of an encounter, the face-to-face quality of a relationship. Existential theory regards people as "reading" each other in terms of who and what they already know. This effect is ever present. Strictly, intersubjectivity means what exists between subjectivities. The "with-world", of therapist-client meetings, as for all interpersonal meetings, is one of intersubjecti-

ve engagement, unfoldings and disclosures of self and other, through time. Intersubjectivity also refers to how people are different and unpredictable in successive times and places. In this way, the meetings of any two people are never exactly the same and are always unique. Intersubjectivity also means that there is no strict boundary between self and other, and this is due to the interconnectedness of human existence. People co-influence each other, and so the deterministic concept of causation is firmly rejected, because no one experience or factor can be solely responsible for causing an aspect of human existence. Because *Da-sein* is a totality of so many aspects, no one of them could actually be the single cause of a symptom, the inability to make a decision, or a lack of awareness. Psychic causation is based on personal choice that comes from a process of value judgements and consideration of the freedom and constraints open to the individual immediately present, within a specific social context.

Neutrality, as a form of minimal behaviour with clients, is only adopted at certain times, and at other times it would be a non-existential way of relating.

Neutrality as an assumed ability of impartial interpreting, describing the other, is viewed as an impossibility. People continually disclose themselves and cannot not do so. Both parties in a series of unique meetings build-up the relationship they share. Because there is no objectivity or impartiality on either side of the therapist-client combination, as a consequence, therapists and clients must take full responsibility for their actions. It is believed that subjective aims predominate in making understanding, and no opinion is exempt from the foibles of interpreting the world. Therefore, there can be no rigid and fixed rules to guide existentially-oriented therapists. On each occasion therapists must decide how to behave with specific clients, at a specific stage in their contact with them. This refutation of the subject-object split in human relations also rejects similar pseudo-scientific assumptions.

After the refutation of analytic and scientific neutrality, interpersonal events are viewed as being shaped by the actions of both parties. It also follows that any area of understanding is also inevitably a relation of researchers and the people under study. In interpersonal events, others react to our reaction to them, and vice versa. In the interpersonal situation of interviewing or psychotherapy, if one imposes little of oneself onto the meeting, then an active

channel for intuition, empathy and rapport is opened up, in which the listener can give more attention to the other's subjective state.

For example, creative silence, the basic technique of psychoanalysis and other approaches, can become a focus for attention and insight. In psychoanalysis the fundamental rule is one which both analyst and analysand must follow. Therapists listen with free-floating attention to the free associations, and notices anything that comes to awareness. This is also a phenomenological attitude, because in listening to others, as though listening to music, one does not know in advance what is trying to be said, and what one should be listening for. In light of this, the basic method of psychoanalysis appears very similar to the phenomenological method. Where the two differ is that analysis interprets all data by its own inflexible assumptions, whereas a phenomenological approach includes facilitating clients in interpreting themselves, to make sense of their own world. So in a sense, one has to leave oneself behind in order to hear others, in the way they are trying to be heard. Free association and free-floating attention are deeply phenomenological ways of relating, as they are acts of reflection and are in general, permissive, tolerant and accepting.

Also, with listening is understanding, better called hermeneutics or interpretation. Interpretation in the psychoanalytic sense is not possible for existential therapists. This is because the act of interpretation is based on the belief that therapists know what causes something, and so reduces clients actions to over-simplified statements. Interpretation is based on finding the reason for thought or behaviour, and is made with the aim of coming to know the reason for the behaviour and what it means to clients. This is seen as a direct consequence of the inheritance from rationalism. If there is no single reason for behaviour or emotion, then any one possible "cause" is only one reading of the same event. Even when these readings are uncertain and meaningless, this is not ignored in existential work.

Temporality may be defined as the human experience of time, which is the intermingling of past and future in the present. Clients often enter therapy to come to terms with their past, which in itself is unchangeable, with a future as yet un-lived and unknown, whilst living in a present moment that lasts from cradle to grave. Existential analysis shows that the major dimensions of humanity are the interrelations and movements of emotion, self and other, meaning and time.

Notes on three existential psychiatrists

Boss, Binswanger and Jaspers employed existential-phenomenology to explicate the characteristics of humanity, by placing norms in brackets, and on a continuum with mental illness. Psychopathology was greatly aided by trying to understand what people with psychotic experiences thought and felt. It is not enough to list their behaviours, as this leaves out the subjective aspects. Psychiatric disorders are of particular interest because they indicate absolute aspects of human nature. For Karl Jaspers (1885-1969) the only genuine problems are those in which you confront your own particular situation (Jaspers, 1963). Jaspers used Husserlian phenomenology and intentionality to describe subjectivity and mental illness. He acknowledged that the scientific method of inquiry does not produce a complete worldview, as it excludes the observer and is full of unexamined assumptions. For Jaspers, human being is revealed in such situations as conflict, guilt, psychosis, suffering and death. It is only through an active facing up to these possibilities that humanity itself can be achieved. Also, for him, philosophy is the process through which people find and become themselves. Therapeutic philosophizing is the creation of a healing relationship which is emotionally driven, intellectually literate, and not just empty abstraction.

Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) developed *Daseinsanalyse* as a form of therapy with the help of his close personal association with Heidegger. The two first met in Frankfurt in 1929 and Binswanger's writings ran from 1922 to 1965. Binswanger also knew Freud, and although the two did not agree on psychological matters, Freud knew Binswanger longer than all his other colleagues. Binswanger later realized that he had misunderstood *Being and time*, but it still enabled him to create his own attempt at a presuppositionless therapy, which had the aim of finding the worlds of clients in which they would be presented as they are experienced. An attempt to find the categories that make up clients' worlds is also initiated. Binswanger's therapy searches for the schemata of understanding that have been privileged, and so colour worldviews (Binswanger, 1963).

In *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalyse*, *Medard Boss* (1903-1990) describes his therapeutic work in a clear and vibrant style. His writings extend from 1947 to 1971, and he makes frequent comparisons with psychoanalysis (Boss, 1963). Heidegger in his seventies took part in joint seminars with Boss for about 10 years,

between one and three times per year in Zollikon, Switzerland. Boss makes his Daseinsanalytic therapy clear by providing many case histories. He accepts much of Freudian technique but little of the theory. He follows Heidegger in believing that suffering is the result of being blocked, in the widest possible sense of the term, developmental delay, as people often inauthentically avoid what is most painful for them.

For Boss, the aim of existential therapy can be seen as promoting mental health in the direction of having a wide range of interests, and much flexibility and "maturity", according to one's place in society. For Boss, authenticity is about accepting all of life, particularly not avoiding what it is most necessary to address. He believed therapy should accept clients and give them new freedom in the sessions to experience whatever they need, in opposition to most of life, where some behaviours are discouraged. But Boss also stressed how he thought there are appropriate standards of behaviour for people throughout their lives. But this last thought is strictly non-existential, as it is the imposition of a norm for mental health which is simplistic and does not allow for individual choice and variations. Such an imposition of developmental standards does not first look at the assumptions contained in definitions of maturity and appropriate behaviour. The Daseinsanalytic therapy of Medard Boss, as presented in *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*, is humanistic and permissive, although Boss only uses analytical terminology to explain his style of relating.

Existential-phenomenological practice

This therapy rejects any imposition of a rigid agenda, assumptions, presuppositions and hypotheses by therapists about clients, which is an ideal of therapeutic behaviour. Phenomenology means searching for objectivity in subjectivity, essences and taking nothing for granted. It bans hypothesizing in favour of description and bringing out clients' views and fresh perceptions. Its theory is purposefully minimalist in using as little as possible extraneous material in the furtherance of clients constructing their own knowledge of their circumstances and entanglements in the world. For instance, bracketing can be practised before the first session (Cohn 1997). Existential therapists could read a colleague's referral synopsis only after meeting clients for the first time. Bracketing can also be used in requesting clients to describe how they see a problematic situation

again, and this encourages a search for new information, and frequently promotes new interpretations.

So one consequence of phenomenology for existential therapy is to request that people talk from their own experience about things they have personally felt, heard and seen. An assumption of phenomenology is that all of consciousness can become conscious at some time in life. Some material can be hidden and preconscious, but it will come to awareness. All explorations begin with the "surface of the mind" and do not jump to theoretical forces which are supposed to be unknown, but present and driving the phenomena. Pure description should be adhered to, along with the attempt not to explain or suggest reasons for thought, feeling or behaviour, and not to prefer one rigid interpretation over others. As well as rejecting and doubting descriptions, phenomenology can also accept a description as valid and real, and urge enquirers to start afresh, while remaining at a level of description. It can seek out all the possible reflective descriptions about the essences under consideration. It does not explain events by recourse to causality.

Also, existential therapy rejects metaphors for interpretation which are mistaken for the actuality of the processes they are used to portray. Metaphors are frequently accepted without a critique or search for what they really trying to describe. For instance, transference and projection are rejected as these are believed to be mistaken metaphors for the effects of temporality, and the process of interpreting events by what is already known. Experience is certainly conscious and preconscious, but existential therapists construe the nature of unconscious aspects of intrapsychic and social processes in a different manner, as they cannot be immediately known from consciousness. Deduction by those who have the specific schema required to make these readings, is putting the cart before the horse. However, Heidegger and Husserl both had concepts and places in their schema of the psyche for what could be called unconscious effects and motivations.

Existential therapists need to be aware of defining or imposing their view of reality on others, but do offer thoughts and feelings for on-going discussion, interpretation and clarification. On the whole their aim is to facilitate the production of clients' understandings and reframings. Therapists should be careful in imposing meanings or requests on clients. It follows that the therapeutic relationship in existential therapy

has an egalitarian character. The relationship in therapy is based around having trust and demand placed in oneself. But how do therapists respond to this trust and engage with the trusting person? From the first session, existential therapists would eschew any demand for instant healing from needy clients. If requested to step onto a pedestal, the offer is always refused, answers must come from clients. Also, the locus of control is shared, and therapists may vary their presence in the sessions. When they engage themselves with clients they need to be conscious of the probable effects of their own actions. Also, therapists may answer questions if appropriate. Under exceptional circumstances therapists may also self-disclose, and this is generally done at the end of a course of meetings. Acceptance is a major therapeutic subject and by accepting clients' "maps of the world", and challenging them safely and appropriately, aids reappraisal and reinterpretation by bracketing and the variation of key features of any subject to imagine different possible worlds. This form of therapy attends to clients' responses, particularly those by which they ground themselves.

What are the aims for the existential-phenomenological approach to therapy? One for consideration is Heidegger's concept of striving towards authenticity, away from inauthenticity. According to this direction, Da-sein is bound to come to terms with the limitations on its freedom, inevitabilities and the consequences of choices. But the key question of how to promote another's independence is left open for answer. Inauthenticity is discussed by Cohn (1993) who sees it as the defensive turning of attention away from inevitabilities and personal limits, which we are bound to contemplate and come to terms with. Death, choice and risk are some of life's few certainties. The denial of choice is an attempt to reduce anxiety in the face of the unknown present and future. There are also limits to all abilities, including the abilities to be insightful and empathic.

Also, as regards the possible outcome of therapy, it must be emphasised that some people are neither willing nor able to change. This is only realized at some point during therapy, and often brings the therapy to a close. Perhaps part of Da-sein's freedom is to accept or reject existence. The denial of choice is an attempt to reduce anxiety in the face of the unknown present and future, and attempts at reducing the fear of freedom, anomie and chaos. But coming to terms with life and the active acceptance of our thrownness into the world, with all this

entails, is part of maturity. Existential psychotherapy also enables clients to have intrapsychic, relational and behavioural changes via the exploration of clients' worlds and histories. It also asks us to embrace a life which actively accepts pain, human inevitabilities, death, an existential indebtedness without end, and those things that cannot be changed or carried out. Only then can people make themselves free and more fully realize their true possibilities.

Conclusion

The existential-phenomenological approach is against abstractions and reductionism, yet does not believe that wholism is achievable (Heidegger, 1962, p. 359). A general trend is not to obscure or avoid clients' terrible senses of guilt, loss and despair. These are allowed to be present to the full extent that clients can bear. Yet interpretation, as the creation of meaning, is inescapable as all remarks change the meanings that have gone before and come after. Existential or hermeneutic interpretations are on-going discussions which involve both parties in building more adequate descriptions. There are several different views on existential therapy (Cohn, 1985; Frankl, 1978; Gans, 1990; Heaton, 1990; Laing, 1960; van Deurzen-Smith, 1988; Yalom, 1980). Existential psychotherapy sees human being disclosing itself through time with successive meanings and clients can learn to find themselves by their own efforts. An existential approach is less insistent on rules for governing therapeutic behaviour and more focused on the actual events and experiences that arise between the participants in the sessions. Existential therapy, in its twin existential and phenomenological aspects, aims to use its knowledge with care, and takes responsibility for the opinions that are feedback to clients. It is a tradition where the views of therapists do not dominate those of clients. Existential-phenomenology is primarily a method of description, clarification and disclosure, and not a set of beliefs. An existential approach requires its adherents to question themselves and their clients about their ways of making themselves and their worlds, by relating, making choices and interpretations.

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INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION (IPA) BEZINT ZICH OP DE RELATIE PSYCHOANALYSE EN VERWANTE THERAPIEËN

Viktor Frankl heeft zijn wortels in de Psychoanalyse (YA). Zijn methode heeft hij dan ook Existentiële Analyse genoemd. Vanwege alle ontwikkelingen is de 'moeder' van alle klassiek-gerichte Psychotherapieën in Nederland en Internationaal in druk en onstuimig vaarwater terechtgekomen.

Zowel IPA president Otto F. Kernberg als de voorzitter van het *Committee on Psychoanalysis and Allied Therapies* Paul Israël gaan in het laatste nummer van het *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* in op de vraag hoe de klassieke psychoanalyse zich dient op te stellen tegenover verwante therapieën. De vragen waar de IPA mee geconfronteerd wordt zijn deels van politieke aard, voor zover de politiek bepaald welke therapie-vormen (economisch) recht van bestaan hebben; de betrokkenheid van landelijke psychoanalytische organisaties of individuele leden in opleidingen en trainingen van andere scholen en de verschillende aard en historie per continent of per land van de psychoanalytische verenigingen.

Binnen het onderzoek van Paul Israël komen de volgende veronderstellingen naar voren: De IPA-leden schommelen tussen twee angsten: het verlies van het eigene van de psychoanalyse als een unieke discipline aan de ene kant en de mogelijkheid om geïsoleerd te raken tot het punt van wegwijnen aan de andere kant. (...) Een belangrijke reden voor deze onzekerheid ligt in de moeilijkheid van het vaststellen de respectievelijke definities van psychoanalyse en van analytische therapieën. In het kort waren de theoretische en technische verschillen tussen psychoanalyse en psychotherapie en de plaats die binnen de psychotherapie aan training geboden wordt binnen of buiten de muren van de instituten.

Regionaal wordt er per continent aangegeven wat de verschillen zijn binnen de YA. De eerste positie wordt voornamelijk aangehangen in Noord-Amerika; de tweede in Europa en Zuid-Amerika hangt er tussenin:

1. Psychotherapy is an activity common to all mental health professionals. Those who have acquired a psychoanalytic training thereby possess an added knowledge which psychoanalytically "orients" their psychotherapeutic practice. A number of consequences follow from this position:

a) Psychotherapy is an activity of second rank compared to psychoanalysis. b) It is thus possible to teach other health or helping professionals essential theoretical and technical elements chosen from among the more accessible of the Freudian theoretical corpus. c) Very logically, this teaching is not only useful but necessary as constituting a major element in a policy of openness of psychoanalysis to the psycho-medical professions. d) On the other hand, this situation necessitates no specific teaching of therapy in the setting of psychoanalytic training, which is sufficient to cover the whole field of psychopathology.

2. The second position would be that indications other than neurotic ones necessitate modes of treatment radically different from those of the classical setting, mobilizing a specialized activity of the psychoanalyst

which lies in the continuum of theorizing activity based on post-Freudian theoretical advances. (It is certain that the diversity of origin and of filiation of these latter developments plays a part in the stiffening of positions.) Consequences also follow from this position. a) Psychoanalytic therapy for non-neurotic patients is equal in dignity and importance to the "classical" work. b) Techniques of these treatments are more complex and more difficult than those of neurotic organizations and necessitate a more thorough training. c) Psychoanalytic psychotherapies must be practised only by psychoanalysts. It is thus problematic, if not unethical, to teach these techniques to anyone except candidates who are destined to become psychoanalysts. Dit leidt voor Israël voorlopig tot de volgende conclusies: Voor de YA-organisaties zijn er twee gevaren: elitair en een hegemonistische positie of die van een adaptieve aanlening vanwege de sociologische en psychotherapeutische markt-eisen. In IPA-verband zal dit onderzoek verdergaan.

PH

DE BOEKENHOEK

DE DROOMDUIDING - Sigmund Freud

Redactie: Wilfred Oranje

Thomas Graftdijk

Omslag: Marjo Starink

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paperback f 55,-

Als er één boek in de twintigste eeuw is geweest dat onze manier van denken op zijn kop heeft gezet dan is het wel De droomduiding van Freud. Volgens Freud zelf: 'de koninklijke weg naar het onbewuste'. De publicatie van 'Der Traumdeutung' in 1900 is het echte begin van de psychoanalyse en van de psychoanalytische theorieën over mens en samenleving. Freud ontdekte een manier om via dromen het onbewuste te onderzoeken en gebruikt niet alleen dromen en verhalen van zijn patiënten, maar ook zijn eigen dromen. Hij kwam tot de ontdekking dat dromen, net als neurotische symptomen, een product zijn van bewuste en onbewuste impulsen en conflicten. Freud maakte onderscheid tussen primaire en secundaire denkprocessen, twee manieren van functioneren van de geest, de een onbewust, de ander bewust. De behandeling van neurotische patiënten werd door hem herzien door de tech-

niek van de droomduiding toe te voegen. Op basis van dit opmerkelijke boek ontwikkelde Freud langzamerhand zijn revolutionaire ideeën over het Oedipuscomplex en de kinderlijke seksualiteit. Freud zelf beschouwde dit boek als een van zijn belangrijkste publicaties.

Samenvattend kunnen we de volgende elementen onderscheiden in 'Der Traumdeutung':

Droombronnen

Volgens Freud kunnen de prikkels die tot een droom kunnen leiden (droombronnen) verdeeld worden in vier groepen:

- * Uitwendige (objectieve) zintuiglijke excitaties
- * Inwendige (subjectieve) zintuiglijke excitaties
- * Inwendige (organische) lichaamsprikkels
- * Zuiver psychologische prikkelbronnen

Freud stelt nu dat de eerste drie droombronnen wel dromen kunnen veroorzaken, maar dat het grootste deel van de dromen veroorzaakt wordt door zuiver psychologische prikkelbronnen. Freud beweert nu dat de droom een wensvervulling is. De reden dat dit lang niet altijd direct duidelijk is (bijv. bij nachtmerries) is dat er een censuur op de wens werkt. Deze censuur zorgt ervoor dat de droom niet zo schokkend voor de dromer overkomt dat hij er wakker van wordt. De droom is nl. de bewaarder van de slaap, niet de stoorder, want de wens om te slapen moet ook door de droom vervuld worden. De reden dat de meeste wensen schokkend zouden zijn als ze zonder censuur getoond zouden worden is dat de meeste wensen volgens Freud erg primitief en meestal van seksuele aard zijn.

Freud postuleert vervolgens twee psychische machten (stromen, systemen) in het individu, die als veroorzakers van de droom gezien kunnen worden. De eerste macht vormt de door de droom tot uitdrukking gebrachte wens, de tweede oefent een vorm van censuur op deze wens uit, en dwingt hierdoor een vervorming van dezelfde uiting af. Volgens Freud kan de psychische droombron vier dingen zijn:

- * Een recente en psychisch gewichtige ervaring, die in de droom rechtstreeks vertegenwoordigd is.
- * Verscheidene recente, gewichtige ervaringen, die door de droom tot een eenheid verenigd worden.
- * Een of meer recente en gewichtige ervaringen, die in de droominhoud door de vermel-

ding van een gelijktijdige, maar indifferente ervaring vertegenwoordigd worden.

- * Een gewichtige innerlijke ervaring (herinnering, gedachtengang), die dan in de droom gewoonlijk door de vermelding van een recente maar indifferente indruk vertegenwoordigd wordt.

Naast de 'droombronnen' gaat Freud in op de 'droominhoud'. Hij onderscheidt de latente en de manifeste droominhoud. De manifeste droominhoud is de droom zoals deze zich aan ons voordoet. De latente droominhoud bestaat uit het onbewuste materiaal, de wensen, dat de aanleiding voor de droom is.

Droomarbeid

Het proces waarbij de latente droominhoud wordt omgezet in de manifeste wordt de droomarbeid genoemd. Deze droomarbeid heeft vier 'instrumenten' tot zijn beschikking om deze omvorming te bewerkstelligen:

- * Verdichtingsarbeid: Een aantal droominhouden wordt samengevoegd tot een geheel. Freud noemt ook de meervoudige gedetermineerdheid van de droombeelden, wat wil zeggen dat elk droombeeld staat voor een heel scala van droomgedachten die door samenwerking tot de vorming van dat beeld gekomen zijn.

- * Verschuivingsarbeid: Dit is een soort accentverplaatsing. Wat in de latente droominhoud een dreigende aard heeft, wordt omgezet in iets onschuldigs, iets triviaals. De emotie die bij de latente droominhoud hoort, wordt echter niet omgezet, zodat iets heel onbeduidends in de droom de dromer toch heel erg angstig kan maken.

- * Inachtneming der plastische mogelijkheden: Omvorming van de droomgedachten tot de (voornamelijk) visuele voorstellingen van de droom.

- * Secundaire bewerking of revisie: Dit treedt op bij het ontwaken. De dromer tracht zich de droom voor de geest te halen en voegt elementen aan de droom toe, of laat deze juist weg. De droom is onsamenhangend, maar de dromer tracht er op deze manier structuur in aan te brengen.

Bij het duiden van een droom, het omzetten van de manifeste naar de latente droominhoud,

is het dus zaak deze bewerkingen te herkennen en de originele wens of gedachte eruit te destilleren. Freud maakt hierbij gebruik van de vrije associatie. Zijn patienten (Freud was psychiater) moesten alles opnoemen wat in hun bovenkwam, zonder uitzondering. Vaak komen er zo erg onwaarschijnlijke associaties boven, maar deze zijn volgens Freud altijd correct omdat ze al eens eerder gemaakt zijn, nl. in de droom. Bij de onwaarschijnlijke en oppervlakkige associatie hoort nl. een diepere associatie, die echter aan de regels van de censuur onderworpen is. Hoewel de resultaten van deze methode vaak dus erg vergezocht lijken, zijn ze volgens Freud nagenoeg altijd correct.

Es, Ich en Über-Ich

Begrippen die in bovenstaande tekst nog niet genoemd zijn, zijn het Ich, het Es en het Über-Ich. Dit zijn de delen waarin Freud ons onbewustzijn onderverdeelt.

Es

Het Es, ook wel Id genoemd, is de bron van verlangens en driften binnen de persoonlijkheid. Het Es wordt geregeert door een soort lustprincipe. Het enige waar het Es op uit is, is de bevrediging van zijn driften en verlangens. Alle energie voor het psychisch functioneren komt voort uit het Es, maar kan ook door het Ich en het Über-Ich aangewend worden.

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Über-Ich

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n Traumdeutung', feitelijk kwam het boek immers
e in 1899 uit, maar het zou misschien wel hét
n meest bepalende psychologische boek van de
v 20ste eeuw geworden - uitgegeven in 1900.

PH

r **PSYCHOLOGIE VAN A TOT Z**

b **RUIM 4000 TERMEN**

o **OPZOEKBOEK**

d *A. Bergsma & K. Van Petersen*

e Uitgeverij Het Spectrum 1998

n ISBN: 9027461724

. 415 p. Paperback

Prijs: f 29,90

De psychologie kent een groot aantal theoretische stromingen en vele toepassingsgebieden, met ieder hun eigen vaktaal. In dit opzoekboek worden de belangrijkste begrippen uit de psychologie beschreven. Dit opzoekboek is in het bijzonder bedoeld voor beginnende psychologiestudenten en voor alle anderen die in de psychologie geïnteresseerd zijn of dit vak als onderdeel van hun studie volgen.

Psychologie van A tot Z is een breed boekje geworden. Klassiek en 'alternatieve' stromingen worden alfabetisch naast elkaar gezet. Frankl en Logotherapie worden ook behandeld. Een klein detail: Viktor is met een 'k' als het om Frankl gaat. Citaat:

logotherapie van Victor Frankl

Een vorm van psychotherapie waarbij de cliënt geleerd wordt zichzelf te accepteren en zichzelf te zien in relatie tot een groter geheel, zoals het gezin of de samenleving. Soms ook aangeduid als de derde Weense school (na Sigmund Freud en Alfred Adler). De logotherapie wordt ook wel existentiële therapie of existentiële therapie genoemd, termen die eveneens gebruikt worden voor de existentiële analyse.

existentiële analyse

Ook Daseinsanalyse. Vorm van psychotherapie, gericht op de directe ervaringen van de persoon in de huidige situatie, op het bewust worden van zichzelf en zijn eigen bestaan (existentie). De existentiële analyse staat tegenover de psychoanalyse, die de oorzaak van emotionele problemen veeleer herleidt tot conflicten in het verleden. De existentiële analyse werd gepropageerd in de jaren vijftig door de Zwitserse psychiaters Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) en Medard Boss (geb. 1903) en is sterk beïnvloed door de fenomenologie en de filosofie van Martin Heidegger, aan wie ook de term Dasein (het er-zijn, de existentie van de persoon in zijn eigen wereld) is ontleend. De existentiële analyse wordt ook wel existentiële therapie of existentiële therapie genoemd, termen die eveneens gebruikt worden voor de logotherapie van Victor Frankl.

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De lezer van het Bulletin kan zelf bepalen in

Deze drie onderdelen vormen dus onze persoonlijkheid. Overdag wordt het Es in bedwang gehouden door het Ich. Het Ich is dus de censurerende instantie die al eerder genoemd is, en het Es is de bron van de (primitieve) wensen. Als er ook maar enige aanleiding toe is, zal het Ich materiaal uit het Es 'terugsturen'. 's nachts ligt de situatie anders. Het Ich is verzwakt en is veel soepeler in het doorlaten van materiaal uit het Es. Het enige criterium dat er volgens Freud nog is, is dat de slaper niet wakker mag worden van hetgeen hij droomt. Het materiaal uit het Es moet dus wel vervormd worden voor het door het Ich toegelaten wordt. Dit gebeurt door de al eerder genoemde droomarbeid.

Deze nieuwe uitgave heeft een aantal veranderingen ondergaan ten opzichte van de vorige Nederlandse uitgave van Boom. Een belangrijk verschil is vooral de prijs. Met f 55,- is deze een stuk toegankelijker voor een breder publiek dan de vorige editie in 'Sigmund Freud - Nederlandse Editie'. Verder is de redactionele inleiding vervangen door een nieuwe inleiding van dr. Harry Stroeken, die in Psychoanalytisch Nederland openbaar aan de weg timmert. Vervallen is verder de 'verklaring van psychoanalytische begrippen', maar daarvoor kan men immers al een tijdje terecht bij Harry Stroeken's 'Psychoanalytisch woordenboek' (ook van Boom - ISBN 9053521704). Overigens: in de andere delen van de 'Nederlandse Editie' stonden de begrippen ook opgenomen. Ook de bibliografie is behoorlijk ingeperkt. Is dat bezwaarlijk? Nee, het gaat dan om literatuur voor wetenschappelijke doeleinden. En als men wetenschappelijk over 'Der Traumdeutung' wil publiceren, dan is men toch aangewezen op de grondtekst. Een laatste verschil is de paperback tegenover het eerdere gebonden boek. Ja, het verschil in prijs moet ergens zichtbaar worden, natuurlijk.

Uitgeverij Boom heeft een keurige uitgave gerealiseerd voor het échte jubileumjaar van 'Der

hoeverre Het Spectrum geslaagd is een adequate eerste indruk te geven van Frankl en de Existentiële Analyse.

Overigens: Deze teksten heb ik rechtstreeks van uit de CD-rom 'Spectrum Encyclopedie 1998' met 'knippen' en 'plakken' binnengehaald. Op de CD-rom is, zover ik gecontroleerd heb, het hele boek opgenomen. Naast het voordeel van niet uittypen van bovenstaande teksten levert de CD-rom nog méer trefwoorden onder deelgebied 'psychologie'. In de encyclopedie zijn blijkbaar meer van deze boeken samengebracht.

Met de aantekening, dat het een thema-woordenboek is, gericht op een niet-wetenschappelijk publiek, heeft Het Spectrum een bruikbaar naslagwerk neergezet voor een sympathieke prijs. Aan de lezer is het om te kiezen voor de bredere 'Spectrum Encyclopedie' op CD-rom of het 'opzoekboek'.

PH

DE MENS IN DE FILOSOFIE VAN DE TWINTIGSTE EEUW, J. Sperna Weiland

Uitgever: Meulenhoff/Kritak

Verschenen in: 1999 (1ste druk febr., 2e april)

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Paperback, 381 p. f 49,90

Iedereen heeft een beeld van zichzelf, van anderen, van de mens in het algemeen. Soms is dat beeld onsamenhangend, dan weer te mooi om waar te zijn. Wat mensen doen en laten wordt niet alleen door omstandigheden bepaald, maar ook en misschien nog meer door het beeld dat zij van zichzelf en anderen hebben. De mens in de filosofie van de twintigste eeuw is een uitnodiging tot nadenken, meedenken en tegendenken over mensbeelden, tot het ophelderen van het grote onbekende raadsel dat de mens is. De schrijver Sperna Weiland heeft in dit boek de geheimtaal die onder filosofen zo gebruikelijk is, vermeden. Bij het schrijven had hij de lezers voor ogen die niet of slechts gedeeltelijk ingewijd zijn in de filosofie, maar die wel bereid zijn over zichzelf en de anderen na te denken.

Het boek bestaat uit een reeks miniaturen van twintigste-eeuwse filosofen, waardoor het aangenaam concreet blijft. Het begint overigens met twee denkers uit de negentiende eeuw er totaal anders uitgezien zou hebben, Karl Marx en Friedrich Nietzsche. Aan de orde komen onder anderen Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers, Martin Buber, Ernst Bloch, Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Herbert

Marcuse, Jürgen Habermass, Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas en Jacques Derrida.

Een interessant boek, het leest bijna als een roman, in dat opzicht is de vergelijking met 'De wereld van Sofie' correct. Of is het een aardig vervolg op Bertrand Russel's 'Geschiedenis van de Westerse Filosofie'?

DE KLOOF TUSSEN OUD EN JONG VERDIEPT ZICH

Dat is de uitkomst van een landelijk onderzoek dat vorige maand in Duitsland werd gehouden. Herder Korrespondenz, maandblad voor maatschappij en religie, bericht er over in haar juni-nummer en noemt de uitkomsten schokkend. Wie meent dat de situatie in Nederland beter is moet maar eens recente rapporten van het Sociaal cultureel planbureau doorlezen. Het onderzoek, in overheidsopdracht uitgevoerd door het Sociaal-wetenschappelijk instituut voor toekomstvragen in Mannheim, concentreerde zich op de leeftijdscategorieën 15 tot 20 jaar en 60 en ouder. Hieruit blijkt dat zelfs in familieverband slechts eenderde van de jeugd en 39 procent van de ouderen serieuze pogingen tot wederzijdse relaties onderneemt. Daarbuiten liggen de percentages nog lager. Zeker als je er de ontmoetingen in werkverband van aftrekt. Dan praat maar één op de 25 jongeren tussen is en 20 ooit uit zichzelf met een oudere boven de zestig. Omgekeerd nemen de meeste bejaarden evenmin initiatief tot echt contact.

Volgens de onderzoekers uit Mannheim blijkt uit de cijfers dat onze moderne samenleving zich weinig tot niets gelegen laat liggen aan de ervaring en wijsheid die ouderen mogelijk op jongere generaties kunnen overdragen. Oud en jong lopen steeds meer aan elkaar voorbij. Niet in wrok - je zou bijna wensen dat het zo was - maar in onverschilligheid.

Dat is, zo luidt de boodschap uit Mannheim, een gevaarlijk perspectief voor een samenleving als de Duitse (en vrijwel de hele rest van West-Europa, cr) die met sterke vergrijzing wordt geconfronteerd. Wanneer oud en jong niet meer samenwerken en weigeren met elkaar in gesprek te komen, kan dat op den duur dramatische gevolgen hebben voor de samenhang in en de levensvatbaarheid van de West-Europese democratieën. Jan Glastra van Loon, lid van de Eerste Kamer, is een van de bejaarden die wel hun mond opendoen. In het kwartaaltijdschrift *Filosofie & Praktijk* schetst hij een somber toekomstbeeld als jong én oud niet veel meer innerlijke discipline tonen en almaar voortgaan op de snelweg naar ultieme behoeftebevrediging.

Glastra Van Loon: „We zijn aangekomen op een punt in de ontwikkeling van onze cultuur waarop de ontremming van neigingen en begeertes zozeer veld wint, dat de grondslag van cultuur in welke vorm dan ook daardoor wordt aangetast. Wanneer niet alleen de onmiddellijke bevrediging van onze behoeften maar ook onze reacties op wat daaraan in de weg staat, in de ban komen van onze hang naar onmiddellijke resultaten en wanneer geweld steeds vaker wordt gezien als probaat middel om die onmiddellijkheid te bewerkstelligen, raken we verzeild in een vicieuze cirkel.“

(Trouw/Crijnen)

SPES ALTERA VITAE

Op een mooie voorjaarsavond wandel ik door oud-Amsterdam, op weg naar een vergadering in het warmste deel van de stad. Vanaf het station kom je langs de Sint Olofskapel. Boven de deur van de kapel staat 'Spes Altera Vitae'; hoop verandert het leven. We kennen die uitspraak als 'hoop doet leven'. Maar feitelijk verandert de hoop het leven.

In de waardenanalyse die Frankl heeft ontworpen, staat de hoop bij het lijden. Als je in de waardencirkel (elders noem ik dat 'the existential ID') begint de mens met een onvoorwaardelijk 'ja' ten opzichte van het leven. Dat 'Ja' dat je in elk klein kind ziet, dat is een innige innerlijke en onvoorwaardelijke verbondenheid die ook wel als 'liefde zonder meer' bekend is. Vanuit dat moment, die beslissing gaat het rechtsom, naar wat in de waardencirkel 'lijden' genoemd is. Lijden is het moment waarin de mens zichzelf prijs geeft vanuit de liefde zelf, en het is het spannendste punt tussen het persoonlijkste 'ja-woord' aan de ene kant en het 'ja-woord van het leven zelf' aan de andere kant. Als het leven mij niet vertrouwd, zoals ik op mijn beurt van het leven houd, dan kan ik mijzelf niet geven. Tussen liefde en hoop als daad en vraag kan ik niet anders dan zelf antwoorden.

Lijden is niet noodzakelijk rampzalig verliezen.

Lijden is de conditie waarin ik mij met het bestaan versta. Het wordt mogelijk gemaakt doordat het leven zelf mij met vertrouwen in mijn liefde vraagt te zijn wie ik kan zijn in een omstandigheid die slechts als 'imperfectie' en 'voorlopigheid' gekend kan worden.

Bij lijden moet ik vaak denken aan wat in de bijbel staat over klagende mannen. Het leven van die mannen (en ook dat van hun vrouwen en kinderen) speelt zich af in een bezet land met een bezetter die eigenlijk niets anders wil dan totale maatschappelijke, materiële, fysieke en geestelijke onderwerping. Verzet en vechten hebben geen zin, want beide mogelijkheden zijn eigenlijk de weg naar zelfmoord en vernietiging. Geen wonder dat er mannen zijn die klagen. Dan schrijft iemand die mannen een brief en houdt die mannen iets ongehoord voor.

Er wordt een beroep gedaan op hun gezonde verstand en wel door te verwijzen naar het gezonde verstand van vrouwen. Die vrouwen wagen met iedere zwangerschap zichzelf en hun toekomst, ter wille van hun hoop dat een van hun kinderen wellicht dat ene beloofde kind zal zijn dat aan alle onderdrukking, ziekte en pijn

een einde zal maken. Achter die hoop op dat ene concrete kind staat een jawoord uit de liefde die alle verstand te boven gaat. Het leven zelf vertrouwt op vrouwen die zichzelf ter wille van het leven durven wagen. Die hoop is het die het leven verandert.

Zwangerschap in het jaar nul was een riskante aangelegenheid en zeker in het perspectief van een stilzwijgende etnische zuivering kon je vragen stellen bij de zin van zwangerschap. De vraag van de mannen was een vraag naar de zin van het bestaan. De wedervraag was en is: wat doe je zelf?

Je kunt nog zoveel woorden besteden aan jouw 'ja, ik heb het leven onvoorwaardelijk lief' en je kunt eindeloos discussiëren over de mogelijke toekomst die daaruit zou kunnen volgen, maar als jij je 'dit doe ik zelf' er aan onthoudt, dan gebeurt er niks van die toekomst. Dan ontstaat er een lijden aan het zinloze, een lijden dat je jezelf en anderen oplegt. Het lijden dat dan komt is een lijden aan de gedachte, verwachte onmogelijkheden. De mogelijkheid om zelf te leven vraagt persoonlijke en daadwerkelijke vervoeging. Die kan alleen in het zelf doen, vanuit de liefde en ter wille van wat het bestaan hier en nu van je verwacht. Dat bestaan is alleen een leven in daad - werkelijke relatie tot de ander.

Iemand die zichzelf geeft is waard dat hij leeft. Weer zo'n spreekwoord dat we alleen nog maar in plat materialistische zin kennen, want het luidt: 'wie geeft wat hij heeft... is waard dat hij leeft'. Als lijden echter onvermijdelijk en onlosmakelijk bij het leven hoort, dan is de vraag van de situatie waarin ik persoonlijk verkeer de brug naar mijn persoonlijke antwoord in relatie tot mijn naaste omgeving. Daarin verandert de hoop het leven. Daarin kun je de kern van je bestaan altijd tot uitdrukking brengen.

Zo komt het dat we de grootste bewondering hebben voor die mensen die in onze omgeving hun medemenselijkheid blijven vorm geven ondanks alles wat hen overkomt. Zulke mensen zijn onvergetelijk goed want ze doen ons goed.

LOGOTHERAPIE

Logotherapie is die vorm van psychologische en/of psychotherapeutische hulpverlening, waarbij de vraag naar een mogelijke bestaanszin van de cliënt centraal staan. De therapie werd in de jaren 1925-1945 ontwikkeld en klinisch gevalideerd door de psychiater-neuroloog prof.dr. Viktor Emil FRANKL. In 1990 is de methode volgens de Oostenrijkse Wet op de psychotherapie opnieuw Wetenschappelijk getoetst en als zodanig erkend. Het concept van de Logotherapie berust op de erkenning dat ieder mens een uniek geestelijk wezen is.

Dat wezen, dat er ten diepste en ten laatste naar streeft om zichzelf en het eigen bestaan in een zinvol verband te begrijpen. Dit 'begrijpen' is zowel intuïtief, cognitief, experiëntieel als gedragsmatig.

Waar de mens daar niet in slaagt, ontstaat gemakkelijk een 'existentiële frustratie'. Deze frustratie is de voedingsbodem voor allerlei psychische, somatische en sociale stoornissen.

Voorbeelden hiervan zijn allerlei neurosen, depressiviteit, criminaliteit en verslaving. Maar ook het omgekeerde geldt: door een hervonden zinvol bestaan, ontstaan de energie en de moed om psychische, somatische en/of sociale hindernissen te overkomen en om te zetten in geestelijke gezondheid, flexibiliteit en motivatie. Daar ligt dan ook het doel van de Logotherapie. Bovendien heeft deze integratieve psychotherapeutische methode ruimte voor alle persoonlijke kwaliteiten en erkent de methode uitdrukkelijk de waarde en betekenis van de persoonlijke levensovertuiging van de hulpvragende. FRANKL's inzet voor een rehumanisering van het post-moderne mensbeeld in de psychotherapie en het ontwerpen van een praktisch op elk gebied bruikbare methode van nuchtere medemenselijkheid in de hulp- en zorg verlening, leidde in 1989 tot de start van het Nederlandse Instituut voor Logotherapie.